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This study presents an analysis of the presidency in Botswana from 1966 to 2013. It explores 
the character of presidential power, how that power has been used since 1966 and how the 
presidency has changed over the past five decades. The paper traces the constitutional, 
institutional and external and internal socio-political dynamics that have facilitated the 
centralisation of power in the presidency. It further explores the relationship between the 
presidency and institutions established to deepen Botswana’s democracy. Lastly, it explores 
each President’s tenure. It concludes that the presidency remains an impediment to deeper 

















Map: Republic of Botswana1  
 
 
Head of State: Lieutenant General Seretse Khama Ian Khama (since April 2008) 
Political Status:  (Hybrid) Presidential - Parliamentary Republic 
Population:  2, 098 018 (July 2012 estimate) 
Total Area:  600 370 square kilometres 
Currency:  Pula2  
                                                 
1 The Commonwealth Secretariat. Botswana: Map and Key Facts. Online:   
http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/YearbookHomeInternal/138171/ (Date Accessed: 10 February 2011). 






“Excessive executive powers are largely to blame for the current state of our economies and 
democratic credentials.”3 
 
The concentration and abuse of power on the African4 continent has been at the centre of 
economic collapse, the failure to consolidate democracy and the decay of democracies. 
Although at independence, all African countries had formed constitutions with which to 
guide the governance of the state, Africa has a dismal record on constitutionalism; her leaders 
have adopted and institutionalised imperial tendencies, allowing them to rule as they please. 
Constitutionalism refers to rulers abiding by the constitution; an instrument which is meant to 
limit political power. The fact that a constitution exists does not, however, mean that a 
government is a constitutional one; the determining factor is whether the constitution imposes 
limitations upon the ruling elite and whether this elite respects and therefore abides by the 
constitution.5   
 
Given its immense power, the institution of the presidency determines the degree of 
constitutionalism in many African states.6 Constitutions in Africa have not been seen as an 
instrument above political struggle or as a constraint on the abuse of power, but as an 
instrument in the political struggle and have been amended or re-written in order to suit the 
Presidents’ own power needs.7  
                                                 
3 Habasonda, Lee. n .d. Presidentialism and Constitutionalism in Africa: “Third Term” phenomenon/extension 
of tenure; the Zambian experience. (Unpublished), p. 7.  Online: 
www.zesn.org.zw/publications/publication_107.doc (Date Accessed: 10 January 2013). 
Habasonda is a Politics lecturer at the University of Zambia and the Executive Director of the Southern African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD). He is referring to the negative political and 
economic status within African states.  
4 Africa will be used to denote sub-Saharan Africa.   
5 Habasonda, n.d. Presidentialism and Constitutionalism in Africa, pp. 1- 2. 
6 Ibid., p. 1. 




In changing the constitution, many leaders argued that a strong executive president better fit 
the needs of developing countries.8 In fact, in the 1960s when most African countries were in 
the process of decolonisation, one-party states with Presidential hegemony were seen as 
models for development by most of Africa’s leaders.9 The search for the ‘authoritarian 
advantage’10 was used to justify Presidential hegemonies. However, trusting in heroic 
leadership and thus concentrating power in the hands of a single individual has prevented 
African countries from reaching the goal of ‘good governance’, which has led to economic 
and political devastation in several African countries.  
 
The term ‘good governance’ made its first contemporary appearance in a 1989 World Bank 
report which argued that the lack of development on the continent was a result of bad 
governance.11 Although there are several dimensions of good governance,12 Leftwich states 
that in the political sense, it refers to a state with legitimacy and authority derived from a 
democratic mandate, built upon the notion of a clear separation of legislative, judicial and 
executive powers.13 Although democracy promotion has been in place for several decades, 
since 1990, democratisation and good governance have become central to donor discourse 
and aid has been used to promote and reward democratisation.14 The emergence of this 
discourse has therefore led to increased pressures on countries to democratise; ensuring that 
there is a clear separation of the branches of government, checks and balances on the 
government’s power and that constitutionalism is fostered. 
 
Africa is home to the most number of impoverished, failed and weak states. Although it is not 
justified to argue that Africa’s problems are solely a result of high presidential power, 
                                                 
8 Van Cranenburgh, Oda. 2008. ‘Big Men’ Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and Democracy in 30 
African Countries. Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 5, p. 954. 
9 Leon, Tony. 2010. The State of Liberal Democracy in Africa: Resurgence or Retreat? Development Policy 
Analysis. No. 12, p. 3. 
10 Witnessed in the success of the East Asian Tigers. 
11 Leftwich, Adrian. 1993. Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World. Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 610. 
12Leftwich identifies the Systemic, Political and Administrative levels of Good Governance. While the World 
Bank identifies six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption. See: The World Bank. 
World Bank Governance Indicators. Online: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
(Date Accessed: 15 October 2012). 
13 Leftwich, 1993. Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World, p. 610. 
14 Brown, Stephen. 2005. Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa. The European Journal 




statistics do support the hypothesis that Africa’s ‘big men’15 are a liability for democracy and 
good governance. In her assessment of presidential power in 30 African countries, Van 
Cranenburgh concludes that high presidential power is bad for governance as it breeds 
corruption and the abuse of power.16 The correlation between the concentration of power in 
the presidency, the decay of democracy and economic failure, as seen throughout the 
continent, is one of the key concerns that motivate this research on the character of 
Botswana’s presidency.  
 
In contrast to the political and economic turmoil experienced in other countries at the hands 
of ‘big men’, Botswana’s leaders have been hailed as having ‘exceptional’ leadership as they 
have played a central role in the political and economic success of the country. At 
independence in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest and least developed countries in the 
world, so much so that upon request for independence, the British stated that Botswana’s 
leaders were either “very foolish or very brave.”17 This view was also informed by the 
negative external environment; the hostile minority-ruled neighbouring countries, making 
external relations a key component that had to be navigated by Botswana’s leaders.  
 
As will be illustrated, the Constitution of Botswana vests great power in the presidency. 
However, in comparison to the negative experiences across the continent, Botswana’s 
economic prosperity and political stability have led to its celebration as the “African 
Miracle”18 due to its prudent financial management and pragmatic foreign policy.19 Botswana 
has had nine successive elections since independence, and a substantial and increase in 
GDP,20 which was accompanied by a significant improvement in social well-being.  
 
Increasingly, however, literature on Botswana has a negative outlook on the country’s 
democracy. This is rooted in the experiences of other African states whose economic and 
                                                 
15 This term is largely used in Political Studies to refer to Africa’s autocratic leaders.  
16 Van Cranenburgh, 2008. ‘Big Men’ Rule, p. 968. 
17 Masire, Ketumile. 2006. Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African Democrat. Lewis Jr, Stephen 
(ed.). Gaborone: Macmillan Botswana Publishing Co. (PTY) LTD, p. ix.   
18 The term “African Miracle” was coined by Thumberg-Hartland in 1978.  
19 Maundeni, Zibani (ed.). 2005.40 Years of Democracy in Botswana: 1965 – 2005. Gaborone: Mmegi 
Publishing House, p. 94. 




political turmoil is linked to the concentration of power in the presidency. It is also a result of 
the perception of the current President (Ian Khama) as an “autocratic and imperial” leader.21 
This literature claims that under his presidency; “democratic practice [has been] relegated to 
the periphery”22 and that “the rule of law and democracy are seriously undermined,”23 while 
Polity even notes that under Ian Khama’s presidency, the power of the executive has 
increased.24 This literature also comments on Botswana’s foreign policy; Fombad states that, 
“since President Ian Khama came to power, the country’s foreign position on many issues has 
been controversial.”25 Therefore, in order to establish the purpose of this research project, a 
brief assessment of the literature on Botswana’s presidency is necessary. 
 
  
Literature on Botswana’s Presidency 
As a result of Botswana’s unparralled political and economic record on the continent, there is 
a large volume of literature on Botswana’s democracy and economy.26 The immense amount 
of power vested in the presidency makes it one of the most important political institutions and 
is therefore a key research area for studies on Botswana. However, studies on Botswana’s 
presidency have mostly focused on particular president’s tenure rather than on the presidency 
as an institution. Van Cranenburgh notes that while there is case study material illustrating 
the power of African presidents, there a very few studies on the institutional framework 
which enables them to exercise power.27 Spracher states that emphasis on the president rather 
than on the institution is a weakness, but also notes that, “the man to a degree makes the 
                                                 
21 Mosikare, Oarabile. 2012. Khama a Threat to Democracy- SA Professor. The Botswana Gazette, 29 August. 
Online:http://www.gazettebw.com/?option=com_content&view=article&id=14636:khama-a-threat-to-
democracy-sa-professor&catid=18:headlines&Itemid=2  (Date Accessed: 22 January 2013). 
22Botlhomilwe, Monkganedi., Sebudubudu, David and Maripe, Bugalo. 2011. Limited Freedom and Intolerance 
in Botswana. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 332.  
23 Good, Kenneth. 2009. The Presidency of General Ian Khama: The Militarization of the Botswana ‘Miracle’. 
African Affairs. Vol. 109, No. 435, p. 324. 
24Marshall, Monty and Jaggers, Keith. 2011. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Botswana. Online: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Botswana2010.pdf, p. 2 (Date Accessed: 18 July 2012). 
The Polity project codes the authority characteristics of states for purposes of comparative quantitative analysis. 
The main focus of the Polity IV Project was to study: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions.  
25Fombad, Christian. n.d. Botswana: Introductory Notes. Online: 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/Botswana(1).pdf, p. 35 (Date Accessed: 21 July 2013).  
26 Louis Picard refers to this infatuation with studying Botswana as ‘Botswanaphilia’. 




institution, but we must not forget that the reverse is also true.”28  
 
Therefore, a complete understanding of the presidency requires an analysis of both; the 
Presidents and the presidency as an institution. Good’s “Authoritarian Liberalism in 
Botswana” comes the closest to this type of study as it discusses the institution and uses 
examples from both Presidents’ tenure (written in 1997) to illustrate the supposed lack of 
democracy in Botswana. Although in, “40 years of Democracy in Botswana 1965 -2005”, 
Maundeni discusses both the institutional aspects as well as the individuals who have been 
President since 1966 to 2005, he, however, focuses more on succession rather than the 
extensive powers of the presidency. Botlhomilwe, Sebudubudu and Maripe also have a 
similar study. In “Limited Freedom and Intolerance in Botswana”, they “evaluate the state of 
democracy in Botswana under the leadership of Ian Khama,”29 by discussing the institutional 
framework and do shortly discuss Khama’s predecessor: Festus Mogae, with a particular 
focus on the freedom of speech and media freedom in Botswana. They conclude that 
Botswana is degenerating into autocracy, which is a result of the extensive constitutional 
powers of the President and “powers that were rarely exercised by Ian Khama’s 
predecessors.”30  
 
Such studies that claim that Ian Khama’s presidency is more centralised and controversial in 
its foreign policy than that of his predecessors do so without the historical analysis across all 
four presidencies, which is necessary to support such claims.  Therefore, while studies on the 
decay of democracy in Botswana do address presidential power, they have rarely focused on 
the historical evolution of the office. ‘Historical evolution’ refers to an explanation of how 
this excessive power came to rest in the hands of the President; in terms of legislative 
amendments, the internal and external socio-political environment, key institutions which 
over the years have been established, and in particular those that are meant to limit or play a 
check and balance role within Botswana’s democracy, as well as the contribution of each 
President in shaping the institution. 
                                                 
28 Spracher, William. 1979. Some Reflections on Improving the Study of the Presidency. Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 72.  
29 Botlhomilwe et al., 2011. Limited Freedom and Intolerance in Botswana, p. 333. 




This study therefore is based upon the idea that for a full understanding of the presidency and 
in turn Botswana’s democracy, both internal and external dynamics must be explored, as well 
as a historical assessment (from 1966) of the presidents and the presidency as an institution is 
essential. The main research question therefore is:  
 
How has the Character of the Presidency in Botswana Changed since Independence? 
 
  
Aims of the Study 
This study seeks to make the phenomenon of presidential hegemony in Botswana 
understandable, by focusing on its origins, the scope of the presidency’s power and how, since 
1966, this power has been used. As will be illustrated, many of the powers of the current 
President and the manner in which he excercises this power cannot be understood in isolation 
from his predecessors presidencies and Botswana’s socio-political, institutional and 
constitutional framework. The hope is to return the focus from Ian Khama’s presidency, to the 
socio-political, and more importantly, the constitutional and institutional framework that 
enables the endurance of a system where Ian Khama’s supposed autocratic style of leadership is 
legitimate given the legislative and constitutional provisions in place.  
 
 
Significance of the Study  
This work is a response to the arguments that state that excessive presidential power is a 
threat to democracy. Although this research project does not aim to verify or refute such 
theory, the notion that the lack of adequate limits on presidential power negatively affects 
democracy is part of the key motivations of this study. Articles such as Molomo’s 
“Democracy under Siege: The Presidency and executive Powers in Botswana” and Taylor’s 
“Growing Authoritarianism in the ‘African Miracle’” which emphasise the decay of democracy 




risks to stability in Botswana, the Center for Strategic and International Studies identifies the 
power of the presidency as a ‘trend to watch.’31  
 
As stated earlier, there are several aspects which this paper explores that add to the existing 
literature on Botswana’s presidency. At the methodological level, the study, critiques 
conclusions that are based on historical understanding, without a historical assessment; as 
seen mainly in criticisms of Ian Khama’s presidency. It therefore traces the history of the 
presidency of Botswana centred on: the constitutional lack of restriction on Presidential 
power, the responsibilities and roles of the Presidency, particularly in its use of appointment 
powers and within the foreign affairs dimension to determine how all four Presidents have 
exercised this power. This allows for trends in presidential behaviour and decisions, to 
emerge and to be clarified, illustrating when and why they emerged, and therefore allowing 
for comparison between the different Presidents’ tenures and a deeper understanding of the 
presidency as it exists today. This will, while not being the central aim of the paper, 
determine if indeed Ian Khama’s tenure is one which can be said to be less democratic than 
that of his predecessors and if Botswana’s foreign position is more controversial.  
 
Although Presidency studies that focus on particular Presidents are often criticised for being 
‘just biographies’,32 focusing on the character of each President is important. Given that 
Botswana’s weak constitutional framework means that political, social and economic stability 
are reliant on the “good will and benevolence” of the President,33 assessing the character of 
the individuals who have held this position is particularly critical.   
 
Presidency studies are often perceived to fall solely under the Political Science realm; 
however, this paper argues that two key dimensions of presidential power relate to the 
International Relations field of study. Firstly, Aluko notes that, “Because of the enormous 
influence of the African heads of state on their countries’ foreign policies, their nature and 
                                                 
31 Throup, David. 2011. Botswana: Assessing Risks to Stability. Center for Strategic & International Studies 
(Africa Program), p. 13.  
32 Barilleaux, Ryan. 1984. The Presidency: Levels of Analysis. Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 
73.  




ideology are important in understanding and perhaps predicting their behaviour.”34 This 
indicates that international relations studies in Africa require a deep understanding of a 
country’s presidency. This study therefore serves as a foundation for understanding 
Botswana’s foreign policy since 1966.  
 
Secondly, the decline of democracy in African states has been attributed to the centralisation 
of power in the Presidency.35 In an international system where democracy promotion has 
become a dominant part of foreign relations, Botswana is vulnerable to external pressures. In 
fact, in addition to the benevolence of individual political leaders, the success of democracy 
in southern Africa is said to depend on international pressure,36 highlighting the importance 
of both an understanding of the character of the presidency and how international factors or 
pressure affects the presidency and therefore democratic processes within countries. 
Botswana’s image as a beacon of democracy has directly contributed to the country’s 
prosperity37 through foreign investment and development aid, and therefore any threat to this 
image warrants a thorough analysis.  
 
The above international dimension which is centred on the presidency is largely an 
unexplored topic in studies on Botswana. This however, is not unique to Botswana as Wright 
notes in “African Foreign Policies” that this is because of the disinterest in African studies by 
foreign policy makers, the difficulty there is in collecting information but also “caution on the 
part of some African scholars not to move too closely into an area traditionally considered by 
governments to be beyond the bounds of inquiry.”38  
 
 
                                                 
34 Aluko, Olajide (ed.). 1977.” The Determinants of Foreign Policy of African States,” in  The Foreign Policies 
of African States. London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, p. 10. 
35 Van Cranenburgh notes that although more research is needed, the conclusions of her study support the 
intuitive knowledge that high presidential power bodes ill for democracy and good governance in Africa. (Van 
Cranenburgh, 2008. ‘Big Men’ Rule, p. 952). This study categorises Botswana as a country where presidential 
power is high. 
36 Alexander, Karin. & Kaboyakgosi, Gape. 2012. A Fine Balance: Assessing the Quality of Governance in 
Botswana. Democracy Index for Botswana 2012. Pretoria: IDASA,   p. 21.  
37 Ibid., p. 12. 
38 Wright, Stephen (ed.). 1999. “The Changing Context of African Foreign Policies” in African Foreign 





There is a large amount of literature on the challenges of studying the presidency, reflecting 
the difficulty there is in conducting a rigorous yet relevant study of the presidency. In 
Botswana, these challenges are the lack of information, as well the restricted access to certain 
information. This is a result of both the failure of government ministries to keep records from 
early on in Botswana’s democracy,39 but also because the President is not obliged to give the 
reasoning or justification for his actions or decisions. 
 
This study is both descriptive and explanatory.  It is descriptive in that it sets out to collect, 
organise and summarise information about Botswana’s presidency. It aims to make the 
phenomena of centralised power in the Presidency understandable. It is explanatory in that it 
also seeks to find the reasons for the centralisation of power in the presidency. The 
explanatory aspect is necessary as although a lot of this information is discussed in different 
studies on Botswana’s democracy, it has not been discussed within a single study to build 
understanding on Presidential supremacy. This paper makes use of a wide range of primary 
sources as well as secondary sources by both foreign and Batswana40 authors.  
 
Barilleaux identifies three levels of analysis in studying the presidency; idiosyncratic, 
governmental and environmental. The idiosyncratic level focuses on individual human actors; 
referring to the Presidents and the people immediately surrounding them. It is an important 
level because the presidency is a “personalised institution.”41 The governmental level is 
where the presidency is studied as part of the governmental system; “executive-legislative 
relations, Presidential-departmental affairs, policy-making and executive management” are 
the main focus of this level of analysis.42 The environmental level assesses the presidency in 
relation to its broader social and political environment, including in the international realm. It 
                                                 
39 An Example: The Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs only has records of people declared to be  
Prohibited Immigrants from 1980 to 2012. For the years 1966 – 1980 no records were kept. Despite this, thanks 
must be given to Botswana National Archives for their willingness to help in obtaining the records that do exist.  
40 Following the Sotho-Tswana practice, the people of Botswana are called Batswana. One person is a 
Motswana and the language is Setswana. The root word; Tswana, is used to describe attributes such as “Tswana 
culture”.   
41 Barilleaux, 1984. The Presidency: Levels of Analysis, pp. 73-74.  
Barilleaux’s study was written with the American Presidency in mind. He, however, takes a general approach to 
the study of the Presidency and thus the levels of analysis he identifies are relevant for all countries.   




also includes the constitutional-legal environment as it establishes the “rules of the game.”43 
As this study aims to build a complete understanding of Botswana’s presidency, all three 
levels of analysis have been used in this research project to discuss the presidency; the 
governmental and environmental levels in both chapters two and three, while the 
idiosyncratic level is discussed in chapter four. 
 
The decision to avoid basing this research on the Presidents’ speeches or interviews is 
because, “all politicians are inclined to proclaim their belief in democracy.”44 Colcough and 
McCarthy note that the best evidence for this is the respect for the constitutional rule of law.45 
However, as noted earlier, often in African states it is the very constitution which contradicts 
democratic principles, and therefore the respect of the constitutional rule of law, in itself is 
not a sign of a respect for democracy. Thus, both the constitutional flaws (and the behaviour 
of the Presidents given these flaws) along with the respect for constitutional rule of law will 




In addition to this introductory chapter, the paper will be structured into the four chapters 
below. 
The focus on the presidency must be situated within the broader dynamics of Botswana’s 
democracy as they directly inform presidential behaviour, and therefore an understanding of 
why and in what way power is centralised in the presidency, how this occurred, and why it 
has endured; which therefore allows for an understanding of the institution. Chapter 2 
therefore explores these different social, political and economic dynamics, and therefore also 
serves as the contextual framework to Botswana’s democracy. 
 
                                                 
43 Barilleaux, 1984. The Presidency: Levels of Analysis, p. 74. 
44 Colclough, Christopher and McCarthy, Stephen. 1980. The Political Economy of Botswana: A study of growth 
& distribution. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 46. 




The purpose of Chapter 3 is to establish appointment powers and Botswana’s external 
relations as key features for understanding the presidency. In the ‘appointment powers’ 
section of the chapter, the aim is to illustrate why despite the existence of democracy 
protection institutions, there are essentially very few checks and balances on presidential 
power. The international dimension is divided into two sections; Botswana’s relations with 
Africa and with the rest of the world, it establishes patterns of behaviour and what has 
informed this behaviour, painting a picture of both Botswana’s domestic and external 
priorities but also the different constraints that have affected the presidency since 1966.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the four Presidents’ tenures, focusing on how they have used their 
appointment powers and their behaviour in the external environment (foreign policy). The 
aim is to identify how each President has contributed to the character of the presidency, to 
highlight the trends and norms in Botswana’s democracy, their origins, and thus an 
identification of the changes in the character of the presidency since independence. 
 
Chapter 5 is the final chapter and will present the conclusions made from the content 
discussed throughout the paper, summarising the main response to the research question and 














Centralised Power: An Explanation 
 
In order to make the dominance of the presidency understandable and therefore establish why 
it is a threat to Botswana’s democracy; constitutionalism, the separation of powers doctrine 
and the principle of checks and balances must be understood. Furthermore, it is important to 
discuss both the formal institutional framework of the presidency as well as the social, 
political and economic environment which enables the institution to function as it does, for as 
long as it has. This will allow for an understanding of the character of the presidency as an 
institution, laying the foundation for the exploration of the presidency during each President’s 
tenure as well as enabling a firm understanding of Botswana’s socio-political and economic 
context.  
 
Botswana’s Political Economy  
In order to have a complete understanding of the centralisation of power in Botswana it is 
essential to first have an understanding of the country’s political economy. In particular, it is 
important to understand the scope of influence the political sphere has within the economic 
sphere and therefore an understanding of the socio-economic advantages of having control 
over the state, and how this control has been used in Botswana. This brief discussion on 
Botswana’s political economy therefore serves as a foundation to understanding a range of 
factors, such as; the challenges faced by the opposition due to their lack of control of the state 
and therefore the associated economic advantages, which are to be discussed in the following 
section aimed at explaining the endurance of presidential hegemony in Botswana.  
 
As stated earlier, at independence, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world, 
with low health indicators and a per capita income of approximately US $80.46 There was 
very little development, with only six kilometres of tarred road in total within the whole 
                                                 
46 Mogae, Festus. 2001. Economic Development in Botswana. The Fourth Annual Conference of the Centre for 




country and approximately and only forty university graduates.47 The main economic activity 
was the breeding and trading of cattle. While it was often negatively affected by frequent 
droughts, agriculture contributed around 40% of Botswana’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).48  
 
The lack of economic growth and infrastructure development in Botswana at independence 
can be attributed to the minimal investment in developing Botswana during the colonial 
period. As a protectorate, with very little resources and barely any arable land, the country 
faced minimal intrusion as opposed to in other African colonies which were ruled more 
bureaucratically. Unfortunately, this also meant minimal investment in developing the 
country. Botswana’s peaceful transition to independence, however, is attributed to the fact 
that it was not an economically viable territory for the British, who were therefore willing to 
relinquish their control over the state.   
 
The discovery of diamonds in the 1967 was the turning point in Botswana’s economic 
history. This spurred Botswana’s unparralled economic growth rate on the continent for over 
three decades. The state-centred mineral led strategy of economic development produced 
large-scale resources and therefore led to the building of massive infrastructural facilities 
which created new services and jobs.49 The diamonds were discovered by De Beers and to 
maintain control over the resource, a national diamond company which the Botswana 
government owns in equal partnership with De Beers: Debswana, was formed. This discovery 
and equal control over the resource changed both Botswana’s economy and the political 
landscape as well.  
 
At independence, being one of the poorest countries in the world, and before the discovery of 
diamonds, the state was not a means for accumulation or self-enrichment. The 1970s, 
however, were a period of the amassment of wealth, especially for those well placed within 
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the BDP and the government.50 Furthermore, the government implemented pro-growth 
policies which mostly favoured the rich, and of particular importance to mention; cattle 
owners. Seretse Khama, the first president of Botswana had drawn members of his party from 
the class of capital accumulators who were cattle owners, which was a lucrative industry as 
Botswana exports its beef. This meant that the political elite who were, also, the economic 
elite became controllers of economic policy and legislation. The cattle rearing sector was thus 
heavily subsidised by the government. This, is illustrative of the nature of Botswana’s 
political economy and in fact marks the now established norm of the control of the state being 
synonymous with the ability to shape economic advantages for the political elite, particularly 
the BDP. An instance of this was the discovery that the BDP had long enjoyed funding from 
Debswana, which the government partly owned.51 Given the BDP’s refusal for government to 
fund political parties, this discovery caused controversy.  
 
Given the advantages of controlling state resources, the ruling class was therefore able to 
diversify into commerce, manufacturing and real estate. Botswana’s politicians, particularly 
those of the BDP, are deeply entrenched in economic activity, and have close ties with the 
economic elite, forming strategic business networks and leveraging their positions to generate 
resource advantages. David Magang, former member of parliament and now owner of 
Phakalane Residential and Golf Estates, stated in his autobiography that his position in 
government gave him access to information on economic affairs, particularly information on 
land, which facilitated his position as one of the most successful businessmen in Botswana.52 
Furthermore, the political elite’s position of power enabled them to to use their personal 
power and a range of reciprocities to solidify their legitimacy as a governing class.53  
  
It is important to note, however, that the political elite’s stake in the prosperity of the 
economy has ensured the prudent management of Botswana’s economy, which has been 
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guided by National Development Plans which map out five-year strategy for government 
spending.54  While this led to Botswana’s rapid development, there is still the significant 
issue of the lack of diversification, which therefore means that access to economic advantages 
is still highly linked to access to political office.    
 
In order to maintain control of state resources, and therefore the advantages that come with 
this control, the BDP government had to dismantle the colonial legacy of neglect and focus 
on addressing the socio-economic inequalities. The government invested heavily in 
developing both the urban and rural areas. In fact, Botswana’s developmental record has led 
to some authors referring to the country as a ‘democratic developmental state,’55 due to its 
heavy investment in physical infrastructure as well as in addressing its  human development 
related issues, such as health and education which are both essentially provided by the 
government free of charge. Thus, control over the state, enabled the political elite to service 
their economic interests and maintain their position in power as it underpinned the electoral 
popularity of the BDP government as well as the assertion of the authority by the national 
government in general.56 This was evident from the early 1970s and is reflective of the 
current standing of Botswana’s political economy.  
 
 
Constitutionalism & the Separation of Powers in Botswana  
Constitutionalism, simply described, refers to leaders (in a democracy), in their actions and 
decisions abiding by the rules set out in the constitution.57 The defining factor is that the 
constitution must impose limitation upon the government, while ensuring that the government 
is accountable to its citizens for its actions.58 There must also be a clearly defined mechanism 
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for ensuring that the limitations on the government are legally enforceable.59 Scholars of 
constitutionalism are concerned with limiting political power because of a belief that 
unlimited power will be abused. This belief is based on the assumption that it is human nature 
for self-interest to prevail over common good. Although benevolence and sacrifice for public 
interest can exist, which means that unrestrained power may not always be abused, the 
‘imperfection of men’ means that it would occur sometimes, and that this alone is reason to 
place effective limits on this power.60  
 
The separation of powers doctrine falls under the intellectual tradition of constitutionalism.61 
It is a normative doctrine that aims to arrange these organs in such a way that “each should 
prevent the other from having sufficient power to act tyrannically,”62 which includes 
parliament being a check and balance on executive power despite the fusion of the two in 
parliamentary systems.  The principle of checks and balances, thus, falls under the doctrine of 
the separation of powers as it refers to a constitutional order that allows the branches of 
government to ‘check’ each other’s power to avoid tyranny; which refers to leaders 
maximising their interests at the expense of the governed, and to avoid one branch becoming 
too powerful in relation to the other branches.63 
 
The type of political system in place in each country determines the scope of the separation of 
powers. Thus, understanding the nature of the separation of powers in Botswana lies in 
understanding the nature of the political system. However, a brief description of the key 
elements of the political system is sufficient as a foundation to the understanding of the 
separation of powers in Botswana.64  
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There are two main types of political systems: presidential and parliamentary. While there are 
different variants of each, there are some key common features which allow for the grouping 
of the different variants under each system. In presidential systems, the constitution vests 
executive power in the President who is both head of government and also the symbolic head 
of state, and generally; is in full control of the composition of the cabinet, is directly elected 
by the people for a set period of time and cannot be dismissed between elections except if 
impeached.65 In parliamentary systems, however, the President (or prime minister) is selected 
by the democratically elected representatives in parliament, and is therefore often the leader 
of the majority party who may be removed from office through a vote of no confidence and 
in most instances is only the head of government. Therefore, a key difference is that in a 
presidential system, while the president is vested with considerable power, the president has 
full claim to democratic legitimacy as he or she is popularly elected.  
 
Botswana, is often referred to as having a parliamentary system. However, the country’s 
political system has key elements of both the parliamentary and presidential systems. 
Botswana falls within the parliamentary realm as the president is selected by the 
democratically elected parliament and may be removed from office through a vote of no 
confidence. At the same time, however, it falls within the presidential system as the president, 
although according to the constitution may be removed through a vote of no confidence is 
both head of state and head of government is vested with executive power, appoints the 
cabinet and may dissolve the democratically elected parliament. Botswana therefore, having 
key elements of both systems, is a hybrid political system as opposed to a parliamentary 
system.  
 
In presidential systems, the principle of separation of powers is usually enunciated, making 
the three branches of government separate, distinct and independent. 66 In Parliamentary 
systems (Westminster model), the executive and legislature are fused as members of the 
executive are selected from the legislature and the doctrine facilitates a relatively independent 
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Judiciary.67 Fombad notes that in this type of parliamentary system (Westminster), the 
important aspect is that although the legislature and executive are fused, the three organs 
have their distinct and largely exclusive domain and instances where one organ excercises the 
functions of another are an exception which occurs out of practical necessity.68 In hybrid 
systems, given the various types, the specific nature of governmental structure determines 
how separate the legislature and executive are and the nature of their working relationship.69 
In respect to the separation of powers doctrine, the Constitution of Botswana, however, uses 
the Westminster model (legislature and executive fused) which does not take into account the 
presidential aspects of the system: the immense power of the executive, and therefore its 
ability to dominate the legislature.  
 
According to Fombad, the separation of powers in Botswana has strengthened the pillars of 
constitutionalism and good governance.70 The constitution does not explicitly deal with the 
separation of powers between the judiciary, executive and legislature, but does so implicitly 
by dealing with each branch of government in separate sections.71 Although this serves to 
divide the powers of government to different branches, it does not ensure the independence of 
each branch. As will be illustrated below, despite this implicit separation of powers, the 
executive is prominent over the legislature, which prevents the legislature from fulfilling its 
oversight function.  
 
The Judiciary is generally perceived to be independent. However, the President appoints the 
Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal, which casts doubt on their 
independence.  Additionally, other judges, registrars and magistrates are appointed by the 
President with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).72 However, 
the JSC is comprised of presidential appointees except for one member from of the Law 
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Society, calling into question the autonomy of the JSC.73 Despite this, the Judiciary has 
mostly acted independently, indicated by its impartial decision-making in cases against the 
government.74  It is the presidency’s relationship with the legislature and cabinet, which 
causes concern, particularly as it affects the everyday decision-making processes in 
Botswana.  
 
A Powerful Presidency, the Executive & Weak Parliament 
The executive is made up of the President, the Vice-President and Ministers. Executive 
power rests in the hands of the President.75 The constitution explicitly states that the President 
“shall act in his own deliberate judgement and shall not be obliged to follow the advice of 
any other person or authority.”76 Therefore, the cabinet only advises the president and legally 
it is the President who makes final decisions. This phenomenon of unilateral decision-making 
exists throughout the continent, enabling Presidents to make major policy decisions or ‘laws’ 
without consultation.77 The wide existence or practice of this phenomenon, however, does not 
validate the practice; it simply reflects that several African countries face a threat to 
sustaining and consolidating democracy.  
 
The constitutional provision which allows for unilateral decision-making by the president 
highlights that the often-celebrated ‘consultative’ nature of Botswana’s democracy is not 
constitutionally embedded. It is, similar to the traditional Kgotla system,78 which is a 
consensus building system where the other ‘elders’ (cabinet members) support the decisions 
made by the Chief (President). Once the President makes a decision, the cabinet is legally 
bound to support it; due to the principle of collective responsibility which stipulates that 
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members of the executive cannot question executive decisions while they sit as legislators in 
Parliament. cabinet members who oppose the president’s decisions have the option to 
resign.79 The only constraint on the President in his decision-making therefore is that he or 
she is selected by Parliament, which, as will be illustrated in discussing the lack of internal 
democracy in the BDP is a weak constraint. 
 
Maundeni notes that although there have been instances where the President has decided 
alone, there have been few of these instances, and that never has any Cabinet Minister 
resigned in opposition to a Presidential decision.80 However, it is not the number of times in 
which Presidents have used this power which is problematic. It is in fact that the president 
has this power at all which is the issue; as it makes the country’s democracy dependent on the 
benevolence of the president, rather than safeguarded by the constitution. Additionally, the 
absence of a resignation from the cabinet does not signify acceptance of presidential 
decisions, but (as will be seen throughout this paper) is more likely because Botswana's 
politics is often not based on differences in principles or ideology but is based on 
opportunism.  
 
The President has sweeping powers across a wide range of areas. The President is the leader 
of the ruling party, head of state, head of government and since 1977 Commander-in-Chief of 
the Military.81 The President may dissolve the popularly elected Parliament at any time.82 
Additionally, a wide array of legislation grants the president extensive powers, for instance, 
the Immigration Act states that, in the interests of national security, the President may declare 
a foreigner to be a Prohibited Immigrant.  
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There have been four major constitutional changes directly affecting the presidency since 
independence. In 1972, the constitution was amended to make the President an ex-officio 
member of the National Assembly.83 This amendment abolished the need for the President to 
stand for constituency election, while still having the power to speak and vote in all 
Parliamentary proceedings.84 The often-cited reason for this amendment, as stated in 
Khama’s autobiography, is that it was because Seretse Khama was not ‘happy’ with having to 
participate in constituency politics and parliamentary debate.85 While this may to a certain 
extent explain this decision, it was largely influenced by the need to eliminate the chances of 
the preferred BDP presidential candidate losing a constituency election. Although this was 
unlikely during Seretse Khama’s tenure, it was a possibility for future candidates. In fact, his 
Vice-President, Masire, in 1969 lost to former-chief Bathoen.86   
 
The last three constitutional amendments were in 1997.87 The constitution was amended to 
ensure the automatic succession of the Vice-President should the Office of President be 
vacant, and the second amendment was that the President was allowed to elect the Vice-
President only from elected members of Parliament (not specially elected). This appointment 
must be supported by the National Assembly.88 While the automatic succession amendment 
allowed the President to choose the country’s next President as the support of the National 
Assembly can be forced, (as will be seen in the discussion on Festus Mogae’s tenure) at least 
it would be a candidate who is popularly elected. Supporters of automatic succession claim 
that it ensures certainty, stability and predictability in political processes. However, the main 
reason for this change at that particular time was a result of the factionalism in the BDP. The 
automatic succession provision ensured that the Vice-President (soon to ascend to the 
Presidency) would be beyond the reach of factionalism within the party.89 Lastly, the 
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Presidential term was limited to ten years. Before this, Presidential terms were limited by 
death or the President’s decision to resign.  
 
The Parliament of Botswana consists of the National Assembly, four specially elected 
members, the Attorney General and since 1972, the President. Botswana’s Parliament has the 
power to “make laws for the peace, order and good government of Botswana.”90 Parliament is 
entrusted with legislative power to scrutinise bills from the executive. One of Parliaments key 
functions is to constrain or check the power of the executive. 91 The cabinet is accountable to 
Parliament, which is a check and balance function meant to promote accountability and 
transparency.92 The legislature approves the national budget and policies and can also pass 
motions requesting the review of certain government policies therefore allowing Parliament 
to hold the executive accountable and act as a check and balance on its power. The main 
method of doing so is meant to be through the use of question time93 and Parliamentary 
committees. 
 
Botswana’s Parliamentary committees system is, however, “weak and underdeveloped.”94 
The committees are not well functioning in that the recommendations made or questions 
posed by these committees are often ignored, as there is no obligation for Ministers to 
respond, but also because the committees do not have research staff to allow them to 
adequately question executive proposals.95 The committees have to rely on administrative 
staff from the Office of the President, which affects the independence of these committees.96 
This, on top of the lack of portfolio and departmental committees that cover all aspects of 
government operations, means that the cabinet cannot be subjected to strict inquisition and 
monitoring.97  
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Section 92 of the Constitution enables Parliament to declare that it has no confidence in the 
executive. This declaration is not effective as, should it be passed, this would mean that 
Parliament is dissolved, 98 and therefore the decision to “commit suicide” discourages MPs to 
take this step. The clause has only been used once in 1995 by the Botswana National Front 
(BNF), but lacked support from the BDP dominated parliament.99 Another barrier to 
Parliament’s ability to check and balance the powers of the executive is that its members are 
selected from Parliament, and thus these MP’s cannot question executive decisions as they 
must abide to the principle of collective responsibility. This principle essentially binds 
Ministers to be loyal to the President, as he has the power to decide alone. The representation 
of the executive in Parliament therefore makes Parliament merely a branch that legitimises 
the agenda of the President.100 While the principle of collective responsibility is not unusual 
in parliamentary systems, in Botswana where the cabinet has no decision-making power it is 
problematic. The President is able to decide alone, and the cabinet then supports these 
decisions, limiting challenges to unilateral-decision-making.  
 
Despite the president’s power to unilaterally abolish, or establish a new government Ministry 
and thus the ability to increase the number of MPs bound by the principle of collective 
responsibility, Botswana’s cabinet has remained relatively small. However, as seen in Figure 
1, given that Parliament itself is quite small; the cabinet has on average made up a third of 
Parliament which means that a third of Parliament must support presidential decisions or 
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Note:      This graph includes only Members of Parliament who can vote in Parliamentary sessions, it therefore 
excludes the Attorney General. Taken into consideration is the changing number seats in Parliament; 
1972: 31 to 32, in 1982: 32 to 34, in 1993: 34 to 40 and in 2003: 40 to 57, additionally, from 1972 the 
President no longer held a constituency seat (1972 constitutional amendment).   
Source:   Compiled from :i) Parliament of Botswana. 1999. Parliament of Botswana Composition 1965-1999. 
ii) Parliament of Botswana, 2012.  History of Parliament. Online: 
http://www.parliament.gov.bw/about-parliament/history (Date Accessed: 16 July 2013) iii) Kaunda, 
2008. The Progress of Good Governance in Botswana, p. 30 and iv) Republic of Botswana, 2009. 
IEC 2009 Elections Summary. Online: http://www.iec.gov.bw/elections/results.php  (Date Accessed: 
29 May 2013). 
 
The executive, as in most parliamentary democracies, controls the pre-legislative stages of 
law-making, bills are discussed in cabinet meetings (chaired by the President), and are 
presented by a member of the cabinet to parliament. Parliament can then make changes to the 
bill; however, this rarely creates substantial changes or takes away from the main principles 
of the bill. The bill then goes to the President to assent the bill. If he/she withholds his assent 
and returns the bill to Parliament, upon its return to the President, he has 21 days to assent, 
otherwise Parliament will automatically be dissolved and new elections will be held.102 This 
provision essentially pressures Parliament to pass bills that are supported by President. 
According to Fombad, this ability to ensure that legislation is passed supports the conclusion 
that the executive controls Parliament.103  
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In 1988, the National Assembly passed a motion which urged the government to ensure that 
Parliament became an independent institution detached from the Office of the President 
“where it has all the time been relegated to the lower status of a minor department.”104 Very 
little was done to implement this motion. Almost a decade later, in 1997, a similar motion 
was tabled in Parliament by the Botswana National Front,105 under the main complaint that 
Parliament had no independence and was merely a rubber stamp institution as the executive 
had too much power.106 Dingake, in his motion: “Application of the doctrine of the separation 
of powers in Botswana’s System of Government”, stated, “We have become some sort of 
department of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, maybe even 
less than a department. We have become a division or even a unit.”107   
 
The Botswana National Front further argued that the legislature is totally subordinate to the 
executive, administratively, politically and financially. Administratively; Parliament falls 
under the Ministry of State President and its staff is employed like any other civil servant, 
Parliament therefore does not have an independent administration, as the staff are not 
independent of the executive.108 This is because the Directorate of Public Service 
Management (DPSM) is responsible for the all public servants appointments, promotions, 
transfer, dismissal and discipline. The DPSM is under the Ministry of State Presidency. 
Politically, Parliament is subordinate to the executive in that often when Parliament questions 
the executive; they are never fully answered or ridiculed. Financially, Parliament has no 
control over their budget, and is therefore financially controlled by the executive.109 In fact, 
Prempeh notes that the President’s ability to influence the legislature’s decision-making is 
based on the nature of the African political economy, which grants the President control of 
external rents, from both natural resource exports and foreign donor support.110 The 
opposition further emphasised that they were advocating for an actual practice of the 
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separation of powers doctrine rather than just a written statement (the three different chapters 
allocated to the branches of government in the constitution).   
  
Although not a part of the legislature, the House of Chiefs plays an advisory role to both 
Parliament and the executive though neither is bound to take its advice. The constitution does 
however note that certain bills must be referred to the House of Chiefs especially those that 
deal with customary or traditional matters.111 Parliament also cannot pass a bill that alters the 
constitution without consulting the House of Chiefs.112 The allowances of the House of 
Chiefs are paid by Parliament and therefore although Botswana’s Parliament is unicameral, 
essentially this institution is part of Parliament. The House of Chiefs is, however, under the 
supervision of the Office of the President, which Molomo notes “aggravates the oppression of 
Parliament by the executive”, as the executive often gives instructions to the Parliament 




Prempeh notes that the lack of experience with acting as a check and balance on the 
executive’s power, means that without the explicit changes in the constitution to ensure that 
there is no executive dominance, it will most likely persist.114 The two motions raised in 1988 
and 1997 on the need for the application of the separation of powers doctrine, as well as the 
subsequent lack of adoption of these motions indicates the weakness of the legislature. It is 
clear that although there is an implicit statement of the separation of powers in the 
constitution, in practice, the executive is dominant over the legislature, rendering it a weak 
institution unable to fulfil its oversight function. This means that the President (given that 
members of the cabinet play only an advisory role) is essentially a unilateral decision-maker. 
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Endurance of Presidential Hegemony 
Presidency studies must include in their analysis the socio-political context within which the 
presidency functions so as to explore the relational aspects between the presidency and the 
other branches of government, citizens and to the external world, and therefore provide a full 
understanding of the institution.115 The following section builds on the previous section by 
discussing the formation of the constitution, the role of political culture and international 
factors in Botswana in sustaining this system followed by a discussion on how the political 
parties; dynamics within both the  BDP and the opposition enable the President to decide 
unilaterally and with very little challenge. The aim is to fully explain the formal and informal 
aspects of how such great power came and continues to rest in the hands of the president.  
 
Formation of the Constitution  
Similarly worded constitutions to Botswana’s failed a short while after independence,116 and 
thus Fombad notes that the praises that Botswana has received cannot necessarily be 
attributed to the constitution.117 This essentially means that, the constitution is an inadequate 
tool to have facilitated stability, and therefore factors beyond the constitutional framework 
have resulted in the stability and prosperity Botswana now enjoys.  
 
The colonial period in Botswana (then: Bechuanaland Protectorate) formally began in 
1895.118 Botswana became a British protectorate at the request of the chiefs: Bathoen, Khama 
(the Great) and Sebele, who feared incorporation into South Africa. In 1959, the Legislative 
Council was formed.119 Botswana’s first President and founding member of the BDP, Seretse 
Khama was elected to the Legislative Council, as well as most of the founding members of 
the BDP, including the second President of Botswana; Ketumile Masire.120 A constitutional 
committee selected from the Legislative Council drafted a constitution for independent 
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Botswana, which they then presented and was approved by the Legislative Council.  This 
process did not involve the public.121  
 
In February 1966, a conference was held in London to discuss and approve the draft 
constitution. Philip Matante, then ‘leader of the opposition’ was invited to participate in these 
discussions.  Seretse Khama, then Prime Minister and leader of the Legislative Council, also 
invited his Deputy Prime Minister Ketumile Masire and a representative of the House of 
Chiefs: Bathoen. There were the only four “Africans from Bechuanaland” represented at the 
conference, the rest of the delegation were fifeteen representatives from the United Kingdom 
and four colonial administrative officers from the protectorate.122  
 
Matante and Bathoen had reservations on several aspects of the constitution,123 and when 
these reservations were not taken into consideration, Matante and Bathoen left the 
conference, leaving only the BDP (Seretse and Masire; the country’s first two Presidents) and 
the British delegation who supported the less radical party, the BDP. The BDP leadership 
believed that a minimalist democracy would ensure stability and control, and thus the 
adoption of a constitution that enabled an executive presidency.124 The main change made to 
the draft constitution was that the post of Prime Minister was abolished as executive power 
was then placed in the hands of the President, who is also the ‘chairman’ of the cabinet, and 
elected by the National Assembly. This system was chosen to avoid a situation of the 
President not being able to command the support of a majority of Parliament.125 It did not, 
however, include the necessary accompanying change in Presidential systems where the 
President would have to be popularly elected.126 This change therefore, shifted Botswana’s 
political system from classification as a parliamentary one, to a hybrid system; with key 
elements of both the presidential and parliamentary system. 
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Without the presence of a member of the opposition, the hegemonic presidency was born. 
Good notes that, “the Botswana constitution conferred powers on the President worthy more 
of a despotic chief than a truly democratic leader.”127 Bodilenyane also argues that the 
constitution had origins in the oppressive system of the colonial period, as evidenced by the 
Westminster-influenced constitution and the large number of British (in comparison to 
Batswana) who played a role in the construction of this constitution; and was therefore one of 
the reasons why immense power was vested in the presidency.128  
 
This phenomenon of ensuring that the presidency was vested with immense power from 
independence does, however, explain why there have been minimal constitutional 
amendments in Botswana’s constitution in comparison to other African countries. 
Botswana’s president has not had to change the constitution in order to ensure that the office 
of the president is vested with immense power, this was done before independence and began 
the countries democratic record with such a system which facilitated the acceptance and 
institutionalisation of presidential hegemony. The pre-independence process of constructing 
the constitution explained above is therefore key to understanding both how immense power 
came to rest in the hands of the president but also the continuity in Botswana’s democracy. It 
is essential to note that Khama’s stature played a significant role in the acceptance of the 
system of governance introduced by the constitution at independence.129  
 
Weak Civil Society & Political Culture in Botswana  
The role of civil society in democracies is to act as a check and balance of the government’s 
power. In Botswana, the role of civil society in political matters has been minimal. Molutsi 
and Holm note that civil society in Botswana lacks the capacity and initiative to organise 
itself.130 Civil society organisations have focused more on welfare issues rather than 
politically oriented issues.131 Although in more recent years, civil society organisations have 
pursued political issues, such as the representation of women in government and the 
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appointment of women in public office,132 none has directly tackled the issue of the dominant 
presidency, or its excessive power. The lack of effective Parliamentary committees also limits 
the participation of civil society in decision-making and policy formulation.133 
 
Civil servants are prohibited to participate in most political activity, thus, limiting a 
substantial amount of knowledgeable and politically attentive persons from openly being 
involved in any politically oriented activity.134 Furthermore, a large number of civil society 
organisations are funded by the government, for instance, the Botswana National Youth 
Council. This limits the likelihood that they will condemn the government or the status quo as 
they may fear that “if they ‘step too far out of line’ government can easily reduce the flow of 
money or turn the tap off completely.”135 Thus, there has been minimal input in Botswana’s 
democracy from civil society.   
 
It is generally accepted that the electorate in most African states has been concerned with 
poverty-related issues and thus have tolerated presidential misrule, but also the continued 
belief that they can have either economic development or democracy, not both.136 In 
Botswana, however, the tolerance of this status quo is mainly rooted in Setswana traditions. 
In fact, Khadiagala credits the endurance of Botswana’s constitution to the post-colonial 
leader’s ability to incorporate Botswana’s traditions into the democratic order.137  
 
Furthermore, Botswana’s electorate is considered to be risk averse with an emphasis on 
peaceful deliberation and respect for authority, which in a modern political system has 
translated to being ‘apolitical’; reflected by their minimal participation in the political arena. 
While voter turnout is commonly used to assess the perceived legitimacy of a political system 
and electoral process, it may therefore also be used to assess the citizenry’s involvement or 
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input in the country’s democracy. The  low levels of political awareness and political 
responsibility of Batswana is illustrated by the country’s low voting age population turn out 
at national elections since 1965, as reflected in Table 1 below. This is the case in national 
referendums as well. For instance, in the 1997 referendum to: form the Independent Electoral 
Commission, lower the voting age from 21 to 18 and the creation of an absentee ballot, voter 
turnout was considerably low.138  
 
Table 1: Voting Age Population Turn Out (%) in National Elections (1965 - 2009) 
Year
Voting-Age Population 










2009 62.20  
Note:  Voter Turn Out usually represents the number of actual votes in relation to the number of voters who 
had registered. Voter Turn Out as it is displayed above (Voting Age Population Turn Out) is 
calculated by dividing the voting age population (18 years and older) by the number of actual votes.   
Source:  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2011. Voter Turn Out Data for 
Botswana. Online: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=BW (Date Accessed: 16 
November 2013).139 
 
Literature on Botswana’s democracy often cites the Tswana proverb “Kgosi ke Kgosi ka 
batho”, which translates to ‘a chief is a chief with the consent of his people’, to support the 
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claim that democratic ideals are part of Setswana tradition.140 It however, merely suggests 
that the chief earns his authority by working in consultation with the people.141 At a Kgotla, 
while anyone has the right to speak, the norm was to build consensus on decisions already 
made by the chief and his advisors.142 Furthermore, the ‘most prestigious’ speakers spoke 
first, thus by the time others spoke, the position of those with authority was clear. Opposition 
to these views, if there was any at all, was therefore very cautious.143 Additionally, patronage 
reinforced this ‘consensus’.144 Therefore, the value of the Kgotla system is that it led ordinary 
tribesmen to believe that they had taken part in the decision-making process.145 Thus, the 
romanticised Kgotla system that is credited for the consultative nature of Botswana’s 
democracy is in fact a system that supports the opposite. As the constitution grants the 
president the power to decide alone, limiting the role of the cabinet and parliament; 
Botswana’s democracy reflects this type of “consensus-building” around the decisions of a 
single individual. 
 
Botswana’s leaders have stated that the democracy is founded on traditional political 
structures; particularly, the Kgotla.146 This has contributed to the way authority is exercised, 
but more so how it is interpreted by Batswana. Furthermore, traditional institutions were 
retained in order to diminish their disruptive power in the course of political and economic 
modernisation. The Kgotla is now used to explain government policies, and although in 
certain instances, this had led to the reformulation of policy, it is not a common 
occurrence.147 The discussion of government policies and plans at the Kgotla facilitates a 
consultative aspect to democracy, or rather the feeling of having been consulted.  
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Retaining these traditional institutions created continuity in the new democratic order which 
allowed for the acceptance of the nature of Botswana’s democracy, but also put in place a 
system that maintained the political culture of pre-democratic Botswana. In fact, the 
Setswana word for President is ‘Tautona’, which directly translates to ‘big/great lion’, a 
vicious and feared animal in folklore.148 Traditional authority therefore still has significance 
in Botswana, even beyond traditional settings; evident in the acceptance of the 1997 
amendment to facilitate the automatic succession of the Vice-President.  Maundeni notes that 
Presidential succession in Botswana “shows continuities with the ancient Tswana rules 
governing chieftaincy succession.”149   
 
Max Weber’s work on authority has proven to be essential in understanding the development 
of the modern state and is a rich source for analysing and understanding modern African 
politics. Weber delineates three types of authority: charismatic, rational-legal, and traditional, 
of which the latter two are relevant in this discussion.  Botswana’s political system is 
characterised by the co-existence of rational-legal and traditional authority. Rational-legal 
authority is legitimised by having been enacted by a legitimate agency and procedure such as 
a governing instrument; the constitution. The fundamental source of authority within a 
rational-legal framework is the impersonal order.150  Under traditional authority, “obedience 
is owed not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by 
tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional master.”151 According to Weber, 
within this scope of authority, the leader is bound by no specific rules and is free to make 
decisions as they see fit; whether it be according to utility or sheer personal whim. As long as 
the leader does not act counter to the traditional order, loyalty, to the leader is due.152 Within 
such systems, power is concentrated in the hands of an individual “who dominates the state 
apparatus and stands above its laws.”153  
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While 1966 marked the transition to a rational-legal framework, Seretse Khama, given his 
royal lineage, acted as a bridge between the old order (traditional authority) and the new 
(rational-legal authority), enabling the co-existence of the two in the new democracy. He 
used his authority “as rightful heir to a distinguished house to reinforce the post of 
President.”154 Thus, while the president held his position as a result of a rational-legal 
framework, his behaviour, and the manner in which Batswana perceived him, was under the 
scope of traditional authority. This served to establish and institutionalise the presidency as 
an office which garnered the same treatment as that within the traditional system; and 
therefore established wide acceptance of the presidency as an office in which the office 
holder could make unilateral decisions, is not to be questioned and is to be obeyed. 
 
Botswana’s private print media has played a crucial role in highlighting the weaknesses of the 
ruling party and the political system in general.155 Unfortunately, the most widely accessed 
media is state owned, which means that the President can influence public opinion and thus 
contributing to the continued positive image of the ruling party and the nature of Botswana’s 
system. However, Botswana’s ‘democratic consensus’ has been disintegrating, although 
without overt attrition given the political culture of negotiation and dialogue.156 The 2012 
Afrobarometer survey findings reveal that 55% of Batswana strongly support constitutional 
reform as the existing constitution is inadequate to deal with the contemporary issues of 
governance and democracy, against 40% who believe that the constitution is still relevant and 
should therefore not be changed.157 Additionally, as illustrated in Figure 2 trust in the 
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Source:    Afrobarometer. 2012. Press Release: Batswana Demand Constitutional Reform and Overwhelmingly 
Support Bogosi or Chieftainship. Online: 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/press_release/bot_r5_pr8_reform_28nov2012.pdf 
(Date Accessed: 22 October 2013) 
 
Botswana’s political culture of obedience has therefore provided the political elite with 
unchallenged power and popular legitimacy.158 Batswana’s political culture, which at 
independence was even more so apathetic, meant that there was very little protest to the 
adoption of a constitution which vested the presidency with immense power and the post-
colonial Botswana this constitution would shape and therefore it enabled the introduction and 
institutionalisation of such an executive presidency.159 This political culture therefore 
explains the uncontested centralisation of power in the presidency, and as will be illustrated 
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Botswana Democratic Party Dominance & Lack of Internal Democracy  
The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has since independence been the ruling party in 
Botswana and thus the country is often referred to as a ‘de-facto’ one-party state.160 The party 
was established in 1961, and has had a monopoly over the resources and apparatus of the 
state from its inception, as the British, and financially influential European communities 
feared the consequences of the radical Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) coming to power, and 
thus supported the less radical BDP.161 The BPP was the main opposition party in the pre-
independence and early years of Botswana’s democracy. It’s leaders were; Phillip Matante 
who was an anti-apartheid and anti-European South African refugee,  and Mpho Motsamai a 
Motswana who had worked in South Africa and was active in the African National Congress. 
 
The BDP consisted of the most powerful members of the capitalist class, who shared 
common values regarding domestic economic policy and foreign policy. Given Setswana 
political culture; with a ‘chief’ (Seretse Khama) at the helm of party, the BDP managed to 
enlist the support of the peasantry, which was key to their success.162 As Figure 3 illustrates, 
the BDP has received a large share of Parliamentary seats since 1965. On a systemic level, 
this can be attributed to the country’s First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system which has 
led to disproportionate translation of votes to the number of seats.163 This electoral system 
allows the winning party to win with minority votes, as it distorts the relationship between the 
percentage of votes and seats. The main disadvantages of this system are therefore that it 
excludes minor parties and exaggerates the electoral dominance of ruling party. Opposition 
parties have continuously called for the change of the electoral system to proportional 
representation, but the BDP dominant government has had no incentive to support such a 
change, as the FPTP electoral system benefits them. 
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 1965 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
BDP 28 24 27 29 28 31 27 33 44 45 
Opposition  3 7 5 3 6 3 13 7 13 12 
 
Note:    In 1972, the number of constituencies (&therefore seats) increased from 31 to 32, in 1982; 32 to 34, in 
1993; from 34 to 40 and in 2003 from 40 to 57.   
Source: Compiled from: Kaunda, 2008. The Progress of Good Governance in Botswana, p. 30 and Republic of 
Botswana, 2009. IEC 2009 Elections Summary. Online: http://www.iec.gov.bw/elections/results.php 
(Date Accessed 29 May 2013). 
 
 
The large number of seats held by the BDP is a key factor in the weakness of Parliament, and 
therefore the dominance of the executive (and thus essentially the President) over Parliament. 
As the leader of the ruling party, the power of the President is magnified as head of the 
executive given the parliamentary aspect of Botswana’s hybrid system. At the same time 














However, “internal democracy in the BDP exists only in theory.”164 BDP Presidents who 
serve as state President have come to dominate policy-making.165 In 1995, the BDP amended 
its constitution to state that when the party is Botswana’s ruling party, there will be no 
internal presidential elections. This, along with the Botswana constitutional amendment that 
allows for automatic succession meant that, in choosing the Vice-President, the President was 
also selecting the BDP leader, and making them immune from party preferences.166  
 
In Parliament, although BDP backbenchers often join the opposition bench, “the President 
has always successfully appealed to the party structures to impose controls on his MPs who 
vote with the opposition.”167 The BDP has always operated in a centralised manner; the 
leadership decides on policy and strategy. Furthermore, MPs cannot oppose decisions made 
by the Parliamentary caucus, doing so leads to disciplinary action.168 Lastly, speaking out as 
an MP could affect ones chances of being selected to join the cabinet, and therefore limits 
backbench MPs from being overly critical. Thus, while the BDP may be the majority of the 
Parliament, opportunism and the lack of internal democracy within the BDP limits the ability 
of these MPs to pressure and influence the Presidents decisions, and are in fact, to a certain 
extent, bound to follow presidential decisions. While some authors argue that the low number 
of ministers suggests that the President does not use his position to reward patrons, his 
appointment powers are far reaching, and is able to reward patrons in other key institutions.  
 
In April 2010, citing the lack of tolerance and internal party democracy in the BDP, members 
of the “barata-phati” 169 faction of the party broke away to form the Botswana Movement for 
Democracy (BMD). BDP factions have, however, been based on opportunism and thus have 
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played no role in shaping public policy, government responsiveness and accountability.170 
Thus, the return of some of the BMD’s prominent members to the BDP is not surprising.   
 
Weak Opposition  
The existence of a strong opposition is important for a viable democratic system as the 
opposition can act as a counteracting force against those holding political power.  
Unfortunately, Botswana’s opposition parties have not been able to fulfil this role. The 
opposition has largely been criticised for failing to offer alternative development strategies to 
that of the BDP,171 and therefore given voters no incentive to vote for them.  
 
In response to this critique, for the 2009 election there was a clear attempt to overcome this 
conception of the opposition. The Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) and the Botswana 
Congress Party (BCP) decided to work together, naming their Manifesto; “A Nation at 
Crossroads: Which way now- Democracy and Prosperity or Dictatorship and Economic 
collapse.” This collaboration was a result of the “call of Batswana that opposition parties 
must work together to provide voters with a credible alternative to the politically bankrupt 
BDP.”172 In it, they note that choosing the BDP would allow for the further deterioration of 
the democracy, human rights and the economy, and set out an action plan of how they would 
attempt to address these issues in comparison to how the BDP has in the past. 173  
 
The lack of public funding for political parties plays a crucial role in limiting the success of 
their campaigns, as they cannot reach voters in rural areas, and cannot run campaigns that 
reach a substantial number of people. These parties do not receive the funding to the 
magnitude that the BDP experiences.174 The opposition has continuously challenged the lack 
of public funding. Unfortunately, as the opposition is outnumbered in Parliament by BDP 
members who have sufficient funding as a result of, as stated earlier; the economic 
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advantages they have as a result of their control over state resources and who benefit from 
their opponent’s inability to run effective campaigns; political parties still do not receive 
public funding. Additionally, the BDP’s control over state resources, gives them an added 
advantage against the opposition, for instance, in the President and Vice-Presidents use of 
state choppers and vehicles for BDP purposes and functions.175 Furthermore, monopoly over 
the state run public media, has limited the public’s understanding of what the opposition 
stands for. The opposition often only receives coverage when in disputes,176 and this 
ultimately affects the perception of political parties as a viable alternative to the BDP.  
 
Factionalism and recurring splits have contributed to the lack of credibility of the opposition, 
as well as their inability to challenge the BDP in Parliament.177 This, on top of the lack of 
finances in opposition parties to match the campaign donations of the BDP has greatly 
hindered the opposition from gaining mass support.178 As a result of the above, given the risk 
averse political culture in Botswana, Batswana continue to vote for the BDP.179 This has 
solidified the dominance of the BDP, and the inability of Parliament to challenge the 
executive, allowing the hegemonic Presidency to go unchallenged, but also a view by the 
electorate, given their risk averse nature, that the current system and ruling political party are 
the better choice.    
 
International Image 
Botswana has received praise from several international and regional bodies. For instance, the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) Chief Executive Officer remarked 
that, “we don’t want countries like Botswana to be an exception. We want more countries to 
be like Botswana.”180 The international community and the several academic works which 
praise Botswana’s democracy play a crucial role in the continued dominance, and unilateral 
decision making of the Office of the President.  
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Firstly, despite the nature of Botswana’s political system, the international community has 
not questioned the quality or nature of Botswana’s democracy.181 This has therefore meant 
that unlike in other African states, there have been minimal pressures for political change 
accompanying international assistance.  Secondly, the praise received, continues to be used as 
‘proof’ by those who benefit from the system that indeed Botswana is a liberal democracy, 
and is therefore used to quell and ignore internal calls for change.  For example, the current 
Press Secretary to the President, Jeff Ramsay has noted that “the current system has served us 
well and that there should be no compelling reasons for change.” 182   A claim he supports by 
listing other countries with similar systems as that of Botswana which are ranked as “free”, 
by Freedom House.183 
 
Botswana has been ranked in the top 25 per cent of governance indices by most international 
institutions, such as Transparency International. However, as seen in Table 2, Transparency 
International continues to rank Botswana highly on its Corruption Perception Index despite 
Ian Khama’s appointment of his friends, family and former military colleagues into 
government and state agencies as well as his private economic pursuits which are influenced 
by his position as President.184 Such rankings or ratings must therefore be treated with 
caution as the indicators are often generated from the views of those who directly benefit 
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2005 32 1 5.4
2006 37 1 5.6
2007 38 1 5.4
2008 36 1 5.8
2009 37 1 5.6
2010 33 1 5.8
2011 32 1 6.1
2012 30 1 6.5
2013 30 1 6.4  
Note:      Each year countries are scored on how corrupt their public sectors are perceived to be. The Corruption 
Perceptions Index is meant to send a powerful message to governments forcing them to take notice 
and act. 0 = Highly Corrupt, 10 = Very Clean.  
   This index supposedly reflects the daily reality for people living in the country, it however, captures 
the ‘informed’ views of analysts, business people and experts in the country.  
Source:    Transparency International, 2013. Corruption Perception Index. Online: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/ (Date Accessed: 6 January 2014). 
 
Foreign aid plays a key role in allowing Botswana’s leaders to maintain the Presidential 
hegemony.186 A large proportion of aid received in Botswana has been directed to lower 
income groups, particularly in rural areas.187 The raised standards of living in the first two 
decades of independence as a result of aid led to the general acceptance of the political status 
quo; contributing to the dominance of the BDP, and apathy to Presidential dominance. 
Rakner notes that even after achieving budgetary self-sufficiency in 1973, minimising the 
importance of aid, it allowed the government to focus on development projects while also 
ensuring that it allocated resources to the poor allowing the government to pursue their 
development goals and poverty alleviation, reinforcing support for the BDP which, as 
discussed earlier, enables the unilateral decision-making of the presidency.188  Additionally, 
the presidentially appointed Finance and Development Planning Minister and not the 
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legislature is the main channel which external donors and financiers provide support to 
governments, making the legislature financially dependent on the good graces of the 
executive for adequate resources.189  
 
  * 
This chapter has sought to explain some of the key defining features of Botswana’s 
democracy, which contribute to the continued existence of Presidential hegemony in the 
country. These features have, since independence remained relatively unchanged throughout 
all four Presidents’ tenure, and thus the environmental framework which they have 
functioned within. The challenges to this system at parliamentary level and by private media, 
show the widespread disapproval of it, while at the same time illustrating the difficulties that 
exist in successfully challenging the status quo, which ultimately requires constitutional 
changes, this can only be achieved if supported by the BDP dominated parliament.  The 
discussion on the country’s international image highlights that even in an indirect manner 
international dynamics can play a role in the endurance of presidential hegemony. Thus, what 
has ultimately been illustrated, is that the presidency is vested with too much power, which in 
itself goes against the key democratic principles of the separation of powers, checks and 
balances and constitutionalism and is thus a threat to democracy. The weak civil society and 
the nature of Batswana’s political culture as well as weak opposition parties has meant that 
the ruling party has had very little pressure to improve or deepen democracy in Botswana. 
The lack of political pressure and therefore limited threats to the ruling party’s control over 
the state, has also meant that the country has not digressed to a one-party state system as 
experienced in other African countries. This can also be attributed to the reliance of 
Botswana on her international image as a liberal democracy.  The factors discussed within 
this chapter have facilitated the consolidation of a system that values stability and therefore 
the appearance of democracy rather than an actual commitment to democracy. The following 
chapter illustrates this commitment to the appearance of democracy.  
                                                 





Appointment Powers and the International Dimension  
  
Understanding the behaviour and practices of the holders of the institution of the presidency 
requires an in-depth approach to the defining features of the presidency as an institution. As 
the aim of this study is on building a complete understanding of Botswana’s presidency, there 
is a need to assess both the internal and external dynamics of Botswana’s democracy. This 
will be done through the exploration of the president’s appointment powers and foreign 
policy.  
 
Good notes that although his categorisation of Botswana as a liberal authoritarian state is 
rooted in a number of institutions and powers at the centre of it all being the executive 
presidency, the leadership of the BDP, the Office of the President and on the extensive 
constitutional and legal powers; “these adhere directly to the President or are directly 
associated with his powers of appointment”.190 The risk of the misuse of appointment powers 
exists; political or other considerations besides merit may often be used as the criteria for 
appointments.191 The second factor used to understand the character of the presidency is the 
country’s foreign policy. As foreign policy making has, since independence, been vested in 
the Presidency; it will, using both the pressures of the international system as well as the 
manner in which the presidency has addressed them, shed light on the character of the 
presidency. The aim is to assess Botswana’s foreign policy since independence; what has 




The President exercises powers of appointment and MPs cannot veto public service 
appointments, thus, the President can unilaterally appoint or dismiss a range of public 
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servants, and of particular concern, those in institutions which are meant to play an oversight 
role to uphold democracy.192 For these appointees, there is a possibility of the lack of 
professional independence in the execution of their duties.  
 
The main controversial issue surrounding appointment powers, however, is the nomination of 
‘specially elected members’.193 The specially elected members of parliament are selected by 
the President from a list provided by each political party represented in Parliament. This 
constitutional provision was intended to assist weak communities to gain representation.194 
Unfortunately, the provision has been used to appoint BDP members who despite being 
rejected democratically by their constituencies, are immediately appointed as MPs and 
Ministers. This practice has been in place since 1969 and has occurred during all four 
Presidents’ tenure.195 This phenomenon is said to illustrate the arrogance of Botswana’s 
Presidents.196 These specially elected members therefore vote according to the preferences of 
the President in Parliament, but also they are less likely to question or challenge his 
decisions. Although this study acknowledges the importance of the specially elected 
appointments, what is particularly important to emphasise given the powers of the 
presidency, is his powers of appointment in institutions that are meant to protect and deepen 
democracy. 
 
Alexander and Kaboyakgosi note that an indicator to ‘diagnose’ Botswana’s democracy is the 
state of is democratic institutions.197 The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime 
(DCEC), the Independent Economic Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman were 
established in the 1990s. Their existence, upon surface analysis of Botswana’s democracy, 
creates the appearance of a dedication to upholding democracy, but a deeper analysis 
illustrates otherwise. 
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The aim is to consider to what extent these institutions can independently discharge their 
functions. Institutional independence of democracy-enhancing entities refers to two main 
points: administrative and financial independence. Administrative independence means that 
the institution must not be subject to control by the government, political party or any other 
party, and that it should act impartially and professionally.198 Assessing this type of 
independence requires an analysis of the manner of appointment of key persons within the 
institution, their tenure and the conditions of their removal.199 Financial independence refers 
to the access of the institution to funds required which allow it to fulfil its functions.200 
 
The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 
Electoral fraud and malpractices have led to the failure of the entrenchment of democracy 
throughout the continent, in certain cases leading to violence and harsh socio-economic 
effects.  In fact, the nature and quality of elections continue to reproduce one-party systems 
throughout the continent.201An independent body that ensures the transparency and 
accountability in the electoral process is therefore essential for the consolidation of 
democracy, and thus the lack of such an institution; a threat to democracy.  
 
Although Botswana’s ten national elections have all been considered to be free and fair, there 
have been questions raised on the bodies overseeing these elections. The Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) was thus established in 1998. Before this, elections were run by 
the Permanent Secretary to the President, which therefore compromised elections, as the 
President unilaterally appointed this Permanent Secretary. Pressure from the opposition over 
the years led to a constitutional change in 1996,202 which established the Office of the 
Supervisor of Elections. The Supervisor of Elections would still be appointed by the 
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President and thus, the opposition continued to complain.203 The IEC was then established in 
1998.  
 
The main role of the IEC is to conduct and supervise elections, ensuring that they are 
conducted efficiently, properly, freely and fairly. As seems to be the norm in Botswana’s 
constitution, key points are often implied rather than explicitly stated. The constitution does 
not guarantee the independence of the IEC, or state what attributes make it independent, its 
independence is simply implied by naming it an ‘independent’ institution. This, on top of the 
fact that the IEC has been placed under the Ministry of State Presidency, and particularly 
under the Office of the President compromises the independence of the institution.204 The 
IEC therefore, in fact retains the same issues that lay with a Permanent Secretary and 
Supervisor of Elections overseeing Botswana’s elections: its most important officer is 
appointed by the President. Its placement under the Ministry of State Presidency means that it 
receives its funding from it, which affects the independence of the institution as this 
subordinates the IEC to the Ministry.205  
 
The IEC is made up of seven Commissioners (appointed on a part time basis), who are 
appointed by the JSC from a list provided by the All Party Conference.206 If the All Party 
Conference cannot agree on a list, the JSC selects and appoints them. Fombad notes that this 
provision may be an advantage to an incumbent government as most of the members of the 
JSC are appointed by the President.207  
 
The constitution does not stipulate the manner of the removal of the IEC commissioners a 
provision which would have ensured that they are not vulnerable to political manipulation or 
blackmail. The constitution does, however, state that the Secretary can be removed for 
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misconduct or the inability to perform their functions.208 The Secretary is responsible for the 
day-to-day running of the IEC and is thus one of the most important offices of the IEC. The 
Secretary is appointed by the President which negatively affects the independence of the IEC.  
 
Given the electoral malpractices throughout the continent, the existence of an IEC has 
become a modern trend to show commitment to holding free and fair elections. However, the 
lack of independence which comes from the positioning of the institution under the Office of 
the President, the allocation of its funding from the Ministry of the State Presidency and the 
appointment of one of the most important offices in the hands of the President; Botswana’s 
Electoral Commission cannot be said to be Independent. In fact, Afrobarometer notes that 
there has been a 9% decrease in trust of the IEC, from 70% in 2008 to 61% in 2012.209  
 
 
The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) 
Although Botswana is characterised as one of the least corrupt countries on the continent, 
there have been cases that illustrate that corruption is a serious issue in Botswana. Corruption 
scandals that involved MPs including cabinet Ministers in the early 1990s led to President 
Masire appointing two Presidential Commissions of Enquiry,210 which revealed the “level, 
scope and extent of corruption in the country.”211 The Directorate on Corruption and 
Economic Crime (DCEC) was thus established in 1994.212 Before this, it was the role of the 
police (which did not have the capacity to effectively deal with such issues) to handle 
allegations of corruption, or up to the President to establish a Presidential Commission of 
Enquiry.  
                                                 
208 Republic of Botswana. Constitution of Botswana, s. 66 (8) 
209 Afrobarometer. 2012. Press Release: Batswana Trust in Political Institutions Declines, but Remains 
Relatively High.  http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/press_release/bot_r5_pr1_trust.pdf (Date 
Accessed: 18 October 2013). 
210 The Christie Commission and the Kgabo Commission.  
211 Mokgatlhe, Lucky and Molefe, Kaelo. 2008. “The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime” in 
Maundeni, Zibani (ed.). Transparency, Accountability & Corruption in Botswana. Cape Town: Made Plain 
Communications, p. 98.   
The President alone has the power to appoint and constitute a commission of enquiry into any matter to 
determine whether it sits in public or private, and whether or not the report from this commission is made 
available to the public. 
212 The DCEC was established using Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) as a 




The purpose of the DCEC is to “investigate corruption in any public body, including 
suspected contraventions of fiscal and other revenue laws of the country.”213  The DCEC, like 
other government departments, receives its funding from the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, and therefore has a degree of financial independence. The Director of 
the DCEC is, however, appointed by the President. The Corruption and Economic Crime Act 
states that, “the President may appoint a Director on such terms and conditions as he thinks 
it.”214   
 
The DCEC is thus accountable to the President, as the Directorate reports directly to the 
Office of the President, which is justified by the notion that the Office of the President is 
meant to report to Parliament. This undermines the autonomy of the DCEC. Additionally, the 
DCEC cannot investigate the President for corruption,215 and if the President believes the 
DCEC’s access to certain people or information may endanger national security, the 
President may deny the Directorate access.216 A clause which, given the close ties between 
the political and economic elite in Botswana, grants the President the right to protect his 
allies. This deliberate crippling of the DCEC by the BDP government once again highlights 
the commitment to an appearance of democracy, rather than its actual practice.  
 
The Ombudsman 
The Ombudsman in Africa has been established in regimes that do not fit the description of a 
liberal democracy; which this institution is usually associated with.217 The Botswana 
Ombudsman was established in 1995, to promote democracy, good governance and 
accountability. The first Ombudsman was however only appointed in 1997.218 The role of the 
Ombudsman is to prevent maladministration in connection with the affairs of the 
government. The Ombudsman is appointed by the President in consultation with the leader of 
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the opposition. Unlike the DCEC and IEC, the Ombudsman’s autonomy is explicitly stated in 
the Ombudsman Act which states that the functions of the Ombudsman are not controlled by 
any other person, or authority nor can its proceedings be called in question in a court of law; 
219 which protects the institution from the executive.  
 
Despite this provision, the Ombudsman has not always been able to act effectively, 
particularly as he/she is appointed by and reports to the President. However, the reports 
produced by the Ombudsman are sent to Parliament from the Presidency. Despite this, the 
Ombudsman has no way to compel the Office of the President to adhere to or act upon its 
recommendations. Thus, only if the Presidency agrees with the recommendations made by 
the Ombudsman will it take action, making the Ombudsman more of a consultative body that 
has very little power in playing the check or balance role that it is meant to play.220 The 
absence of prosecution powers means that the Ombudsman must get permission from MPs in 
order to prosecute offenders, which is unlikely to happen as this would expose these MPs to 
future possible prosecution.221 
 
Mpabanga notes that the institution is overall considered to be effective given its efficiency in 
responding to cases and government departments often do implement its recommendations. 
However, the constitutional and legal framework that the Ombudsman operates within does 
not adequately support and empower the institution to fulfil its mandate.222 Lastly, perhaps as 
an indication of the importance of Botswana’s external affairs, the Ombudsman cannot 
investigate any matters (as certified by the President or a Minister) that affect the relations of 
the country with other governments or international organisations.223 
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Foreign Affairs  
In conceptualising foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa, Akokpari states that foreign policy 
generally aims to enhance a state’s ability to achieve certain goals and is thus programmes or 
plans which entail action towards foreign entities designed to meet these goals. These are 
usually security and the desire to extend influence,224 which have indeed been at the centre of 
Botswana’s foreign affairs agenda. From independence, Botswana has attempted to develop 
an international position that facilitates its domestic development, ensures its security, and its 
ability to have significant influence in the region.225  
 
Clapham highlights that there were some good structural reasons for the personalisation of 
foreign policy making in newly independent states.226 At independence, Botswana did not 
have the resources to operate a network of embassies nor a strong foreign relations Ministry. 
Control of foreign affairs in Botswana, have therefore, since independence, been concentrated 
within the Office of the President.227 The centralisation of foreign affairs in the presidency 
has created situations in other African states in which the change in government results in 
changes in external behaviour.228 In Botswana, however, given the geographical229 and 
economic constraints Botswana faced, there has been minimal scope for extreme changes in 
external behaviour, this is particularly evident in Botswana’s relations within Africa. 
However, control over this vital area has enabled the Presidents to shape policy on matters of 
vital national interest to the state with little or no regard for the advice or input of any other 
ministry or department. 
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The role of Parliament in external affairs has been limited to discussion on policies that have 
already been decided upon in cabinet or carried out by the President.230 Beyond the weakness 
of Parliament in general and although Parliament does have treaty ratification powers, there is 
no constitutionally defined role for the Parliament in foreign policy-decision making. In fact, 
Zaffiro states that it is premature to discuss the legislature’s role in foreign policy until the 
Legislature exists apart from the executive.231 
 
As diplomatic activities multiplied, Seretse Khama formed a Department of External 
Affairs,232 appointing a Secretary for the department and a full time staff, however, the 
President remained the top diplomat.233  In 1974, a Minister for the department was 
appointed, however, it was generally understood that the President still remained the top 
diplomat and manager of external affairs.234 Although in 1998 President Mogae created the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is charged with implementing decisions taken in the Office of 
the President.235 Furthermore, the President appoints and dismisses ambassadors, high 
commissioners or other principle representatives of Botswana in any other country or 
international organisation.236  
 
Given the limited organisational resources and institutional infrastructure available for 
foreign policy decision-making in the post-independence period, the establishment of 
Botswana’s foreign policy was reliant on the founding Presidents.237 In 1993, Zaffiro noted 
that Botswana’s foreign policy decision-making processes, goals and patterns of international 
behaviour had remained consistent.238   
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The following two sections will explore Botswana’s relations within Africa and with the rest 
of the world. Before doing so, it is important to highlight that from independence, Botswana 
had to follow these key routes in its early foreign policy; to develop allies among other 
African states, so as to strengthen its position against its minority-ruled neighbours. This was 
done particularly through ensuring that its anti-apartheid position was clear. Botswana had to 
ensure that it attracted aid to avoid reliance on South Africa, and it had to develop 
international visibility “to prevent any diplomatic and economic isolation that might result 
from being closest to South Africa.”239   
 
Botswana - Africa Relations 
Botswana’s foreign policy in Africa has been moulded by its economic needs, but also the 
desire to maintain internal security and stability, thus, being landlocked, its relationship with 
its neighbours has always been of critical importance. Botswana’s geographical position has 
played a significant role in shaping its foreign policy. Surrounded by hostile neighbours, from 
independence to the late 1980s when the apartheid regime began to unravel, Botswana’s 
foreign policy could be defined as that of ‘survival politics’,240 maintaining a balance 
between avoiding any action that may serve as a reason for external intervention, while at the 
same time ensuring that they did not appear to legitimise white-minority rule in South Africa, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe.241 Thus, initially, Botswana’s foreign policy was limited by its 
geography, as well as its economic dependence on South Africa.242 
 
In response to this hostile external environment, Botswana was a founding member of the 
Frontline States (FLS), a group of states that played an instrumental role in the independence 
of Zimbabwe in 1980.243 Botswana’s development has thus always been seen in the larger 
context of the development of its neighbours, as well as the strategic importance of regional 
and international institutions. It was therefore also one of the founding members of the 
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Southern African Development Community (SADC),244 which has its headquarters in 
Botswana.   
 
Botswana’s relationship with apartheid South Africa was a difficult one to maintain as while 
it was reliant on South African imports, it had to maintain a strong stance against the 
apartheid regime. However, the lack of a military until 1977 limited the strength of this 
position. Even after the establishment of a military, Botswana maintained a policy of ‘non-
interference’. Botswana also did not allow liberation movements to use the country as a base 
for military operations, to avoid attacks from Rhodesia or South Africa, but they did accept 
“genuine political refugees”.245  
 
In the early 1990s, upon the liberation and democratisation of most of its neighbours, the 
country shifted from ‘survival non-interference politics’, to a promoter of peace, democracy 
and good governance. It’s credibility as a stable and democratic nation has enabled the 
country to stand against anti-democratic violations.246 Botswana has used a range of foreign 
policy tools, from participation in peacekeeping operations, military intervention, threats of 
economic sanctions, and particularly; behind the scenes diplomatic pressure.247 Botswana has 
however, not been consistent in its condemnation of anti-democratic behaviour, for instance 
the lack of response to the 1999 coup in Cote d’Ivoire. Botswana has responded more 
vigorously to threats to its neighbours, highlighting its concern with regional stability; and 
thus threats to its own security and internal stability.248 Regional stability has been a 
dominant pre-occupation, particularly to avoid the spill over of conflict and its effects, but 
also to enhance the country’s diplomatic image. 
 
It is important to note that foreign relations between African states have been characterised 
by solidarity, neglecting the promotion of good governance, democracy or human rights. 
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Akokpari notes that Organisation of African Unity249 summits were forums where African 
leaders would share experiences on how to survive and clamp down opposition to their 
regimes.250 African leaders have historically failed to condemn each other’s undemocratic 
practices and in fact have empathised with each other. This behaviour is attributed to African 
leaders ensuring that are safe from future criticism.251 This does shed some light on why, 
“Botswana has not shown as much concern about entrenched dictatorships as it has towards 
other kinds of anti-democratic infractions.”252 An example of this is how Botswana has 
readily assisted in monitoring elections in Nigeria, but did not seek to impose economic 
sanctions in Nigeria during times of dictatorship. This has been the case during the second 
and third Presidents’ tenure (Masire and Mogae).253 
 
In general, however, Botswana has displayed a commitment to promoting democracy, which 
is rooted in its history in assisting (as far as possible given its economic and geographical 
circumstances) in the liberation of its neighbours; promoting majority rule in minority ruled 
states, to more recently; upon the introduction of democracy in the rest of Southern Africa; 
promoting democracy and good governance throughout the continent.   
 
Botswana and the Rest of the World 
Very few studies on African states international relations focus on the African element of 
Africa’s relationship with the rest of the world. 254 This is the case with Botswana, with very 
few authors having focused their research specifically on international affairs in Botswana. 
This may also be a result of the focus of Botswana’s international relations with the rest of 
the world have been limited to aid and diamonds. The country’s foreign policy has been 
described as one which has been pragmatic, ‘low-profiled’ and cautious, especially in the 
1960s and 1970s, in order ensure that it could attract foreign investment. In fact, Botswana 
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has been characterised by dependence on external markets, suppliers and capital and has 
faced high opportunity costs in changing those relations.255  
 
A large proportion of Botswana’s revenues are dependent on the export of its minerals, 
making access to the world market a key concern for Botswana.256 Botswana is unable to 
generate investment locally and is highly dependent on export revenues in order to fund 
socio-economic development.257 Thus, while the country is more financially independent than 
it was in the early years of democracy, its foreign policy objectives beyond Africa remain the 
same, attracting investment and aid as well as maintaining demand for the country’s minerals, 
particularly, its diamonds. Both these two factors have largely been dependent on 
international perceptions of Botswana’s democracy.  
 
Botswana’s relationship with the rest of the world has thus been one of establishing its 
credibility, in order to attract foreign direct investment and aid, while at the same time 
avoiding the regime changing conditionalities that often came with this assistance in 
countries that are perceived to be ‘undemocratic’. In Africa, changes in domestic practices 
have often been a result of pressure from international financial institutions and donors 
through the threat of aid suspension and international Non-Governmental Organisations 
which use the influence of their home governments.258  
 
There is therefore an incentive for African leaders to appear to be democratic; balancing 
degrees of democratic openness with degrees of authoritarian closedness so as to legitimise 
their regimes without having to relinquish power.259 Botswana, given the many flaws of its 
constitution and the manner in which presidential power; is engaged in this balancing act. As 
stated earlier, some of its democratic institutions have been constructed in a way that 
illustrates more of a commitment to appearing to be democratic, than a true commitment to 
deepening democracy. 
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Botswana’s sustained multi-party system in a continent where, in 1989, opposition parties in 
32 of 50 independent countries on the continent were illegal,260 is however, why it has 
continued to receive praise. Without an in-depth analysis of how free and fair the electoral 
processes have been since independence; and thus not taking into account the lack of political 
party funding, the control of the media by the presidency and its control over electoral 
management bodies, Botswana’s multi-party system continues to be perceived to be a 
successful multi-party democracy. 
 
Botswana’s relationship with the rest of the world, particularly its former coloniser; Britain, 
the United States, other European governments261 as well as its other donors has been a 
relationship of avoiding external pressures to change, given the current international norms of 
withholding assistance to countries that are not democratic. In fact, the United States 
explicitly notes that democracy is a central component of its foreign policy, and that it seeks 
to “promote democracy as a means to achieve security, stability, and prosperity for the entire 
world.”262 Thumberg-Hartland notes that the future of foreign aid in Botswana, given its 
credentials was assured, but if the character of the government changed markedly; the flow of 
aid would decline sharply.263 
 
Since 1992 however, when Botswana became a middle-income country, foreign aid has 
waned, shifting from grants to loans and technical assistance.264 This has made revenues from 
diamonds significantly more important to the country, so much so that Professor Kenneth 
Good’s criticism of Botswana’s democracy in his critical paper entitled “Presidential 
Succession in Botswana: No Model for Africa” (authored jointly by Ian Taylor) was 
considered to be a threat to national security as it threatened Botswana’s image (and therefore 
possibly the demand for Botswana’s diamonds). He was therefore declared to be a prohibited 
immigrant and deported. The increase of similar literature is rightly perceived to be a threat to 
the status quo in Botswana; as it affects perceptions of the legitimacy of the system in place, 
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and therefore the perceived liberal democracy, thus making the country vulnerable to external 




This first part of this chapter has highlighted the flaws in Botswana’s democracy directly 
linked to the powers of appointment vested in the presidency. The aim was to illustrate that 
despite developments in the country’s democracy, these developments have not limited 
presidential power as may have been expected in their establishment.  Presidential influence 
within these institutions makes it very difficult for these institutions to exercise professional 
independence in their execution of duty; meaning that officers within these institutions must 
in most cases think politically before they can make a decision. What has been highlighted is 
the different institutional environment in which the presidency has functioned within since 
the mid-late 1990s, and more importantly, the continuity in Botswana’s democracy despite 
their establishment. The international dimension aimed to achieve a similar objective by 
highlighting the international or foreign dynamics and environment in which Botswana’s 
Presidents have functioned within, highlighting issues which have influenced presidential 
power and behaviour, and emphasising the importance of appearing to be democratic at the 
centre of the country’s foreign policy.  Having explored these dynamics, the following 
chapter will then look at each President’s behaviour or decisions in their use of appointment 
powers and in the foreign policy arena, exploring the dynamics highlighted above, and 











Knowledge of the institution of the Presidency can be advanced through the study of those 
who have been entrusted with it. As noted earlier, a large amount of literature on Botswana’s 
presidency claims that the presidency as it exists today is more autocratic; that the power of 
the presidency has increased, and that the foreign policy of Botswana has become 
controversial. These arguments are made without the historical analysis across presidencies 
needed to support these claims. The following chapter therefore takes a historical approach in 
assessing the Presidency, focusing on behaviour of the Presidents during their different 
tenures as illustrated in Table 3. This will be done with an assessment of how each President 
has used their power to make unilateral decisions, and a particular focus on the manner in 
which they have used their appointment powers and their actions or decisions within the 
foreign policy realm. This will illustrate the trends and norms in the use of presidential 
power, allowing for a conclusion on the extent of the entrenchment of democratic principles 
in the behaviour of each President.  
 
Table 3: Presidents and Vice-Presidents of Botswana 1966 - present 
Tenure President Vice-President Party  
1966-1980 Seretse Khama Ketumile Masire BDP 
1980-1998 Ketumile Masire Lenyeletse Seretse (1980 - 1983) 
Peter Mmusi (1983-92) 
Festus Mogae (1992-98) 
BDP 
1998-2008 Festus Mogae Lt. Gen. Ian Khama BDP 
2008-present Lt. Gen. Ian Khama Lt. Gen Mompati Merafhe (2008-2012) 
Ponatshego Kedikilwe (2012 - present) 
BDP 
 
Note:      Lenyeletse Seretse died in 1983. Peter Mmusi was forced to resign in 1992 after being implicated 
in the misuse of state resources. Lt. General Mompati Merafhe fell ill in 2012 and thus resigned 
(table updated from the 2010 source below to reflect this).  




Sir Seretse Khama 
Beyond being the ‘African miracles’ founding President, Seretse is also widely known as a 
result of his controversial marriage to Ruth Williams, who was British.265 Although the 
Bamangwato initially opposed this marriage, they later (as a result of a series of Kgotla 
meetings) accepted his white wife and supported his re-installation as chief.266 Khama 
therefore received support despite his breakaway from traditional practice or norms; an early 
indicator of the kind of relationship between Batswana and Khama.  
 
Seretse received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Fort Hare in 1944. He then 
attained a law degree from the University of Oxford. In the 1965 elections, Seretse Khama 
won in the Serowe-North constituency by 98.5%. In the eyes of Batswana, Khama was still a 
Chief, and thus his legitimacy was still derived from traditional authority.267 Khama was 
President from September 1966 until his death in July 1980.  He stood for constituency 
elections only twice, in 1965 and 1969 before the 1972 constitutional amendment which 
removed the need for a Presidential candidate to be an elected MP.  
 
Seretse is celebrated for not abusing his power to “manipulate the constitution to suit his 
personal needs and interests”, unlike in other independent African countries in the 1960s.268 
The decision to not do so is considered by some as a result of the leader’s commitment to 
democracy, while others attribute it to the perception of the opposition as too weak to win.269  
In a BBC interview in 1965 after the first democratic elections, Khama stated that Botswana 
would not become a one-party state as a result of legislation creating one. 270 Thus, while this 
may be considered support for a multi-party system, at the same time, the failure to introduce 
legislation that facilitated a multi-party system, such as the continued refusal of the BDP 
government to fund political parties, indicates the lack of a solid commitment to ensuring that 
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Botswana remained a democratic multi-party system. That is, the absence of legislation 
creating a one party state is not in itself a sign of commitment to democracy, it is the absence 
of legislation to promote it which reflects the extent of Khama (and his successors) 
commitment to democracy.  
 
Khama’s leadership was influenced by his royal background and commanded great personal 
authority as the heir to one of the biggest tribes. 271 To the masses; he was a Chief, for the 
small group of educated Africans, the cattle owners and the chiefs; he was one of them and 
lastly, to the Europeans, in the way he dressed, spoke, behaved; he had a lot in common with 
them.272 Khama’s ability to identify with a wide range of people helped the BDP to establish 
large majorities in the early elections.273  
 
Appointment Powers 
Khama, unlike other African leaders did not immediately ‘Africanise’ the civil service after 
independence as he did not believe in sacrificing efficiency in the name of localisation.274 In 
fact, Seretse solicited donor agencies and countries to assist the country by providing skilled 
expatriates. Samatar notes that the defeat of Masire in his constituency to former chief 
Bathoen Gasetsiwe in the 1969 elections was a result of the dissatisfaction with the rate at 
which localisation was occurring.275 Khama then used the specially elected provision to bring 
Masire back into the cabinet as the Vice-President, despite the electorates’ decision not to 
make Masire an MP. This was an early indicator of the kind of democracy to be established 
in Botswana. This decision established the now ‘norm’, to subordinate the preferences of 
voters to those of the President.  
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Furthermore, in 1972, along with the provision that presidential candidates did not have to 
stand for elections, Khama introduced a constitutional requirement that chiefs had to have 
resigned from their positions for a period of five years before they could stand for 
Parliamentary election.276 This was in response to former Chief Bathoen winning ‘Masire’s 
constituency’. Thus, while Khama retained a multi-party system, this is in fact because 
political parties were not considered a credible threat, but he did enact a law that would 
prevent those he did see as credible opponents from participating in elections.   
 
Another, example of how Seretse Khama used his appointment powers which left a legacy or 
perhaps support for the action of future Presidents was his decision to appoint his son, Ian 
Khama, as a Brigadier and Deputy- Commander of the BDF277 despite there being older (Ian 
Khama was at the time only 24 years old and only had four years’ experience in the 
‘military’) and more experienced officers.278 This set a dangerous precedent, which illustrated 
that the President could clearly make appointments that are not based on merit but rather 
personal discretion. It also indicated that Batswana, given the political culture of not 
challenging authority, particularly given the traditional authority Khama wielded, would 
allow this to occur; and thus marks the beginning of the institutionalisation of appointments 
as a reward to loyalists.  
 
In 1970, Seretse established the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, giving the 
portfolio of this Ministry to then Vice-President Ketumile Masire, “the President’s closest 
political ally and confidant,” signalling that this was the most important Ministry (other than 
the Presidency).279 This Ministry was responsible for planning, budgeting and coordinating 
all development activities; it dominated all other Ministries, which then essentially became 
project implementation bodies.280 Khama and his Vice-President therefore, limited the power 
of the individual Ministries and increased the power of the presidency.  
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Seretse’s cabinet perceived him to be the ‘cosmopolitan’ amongst them and he therefore took 
the lead in dealing with the largely expatriate civil service and in Botswana’s foreign 
relations.281 Khama’s external affairs vision dominated the foreign affairs arena, with little 
room for debate.282 Therefore, the role of backbenchers during Khama’s tenure was not to 
participate in the policy formulation process but to go to the people and “sell” the policies.283  
 
Seretse’s main task at independence was to ensure the safety of Botswana. At the time, 
Botswana faced hostility from the South African government which wanted to incorporate 
Botswana into South Africa, and minority ruled Namibia and Rhodesia. Seretse, dealt with 
this by not establishing a military until 1977, and only offered sanctuary to ‘bona fide 
refugees’ while at the same time refusing the establishment of guerrillas in Botswana, to 
deprive its neighbours of any excuse to invade the country 284 This was Botswana’s way of 
contributing to the liberation of her neighbours without directly endangering Batswana. In 
fact, Khama stated that: “I recognise only too clearly that my country’s prospects of fully 
independent development are inextricably bound up with the emancipation of all the 
minority-ruled populations of Southern Africa.”285 
 
Clapham notes that the extremely personal character of the leadership in post-independence 
Africa has had a pronounced effect on external relations.286 Given Khama’s marriage to Ruth, 
he did not hesitate to speak against racial discrimination and to advocate reconciliation,287 a 
courageous political act given Botswana’s heavy reliance for basic food imports produced in 
South Africa. This meant that Botswana had to maintain good relations with South Africa, 
and Khama decided that foreign policy towards South Africa would be defined by the 
interests of Batswana rather than emotion and sentiment.288 Botswana cooperated with South 
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Africa “as far as our national conscience will permit us to do,”289 while avoiding any action 
that would be interpreted as ‘condoning apartheid’,290 an act which would result in hostility 
from other African countries.  
One of the most important foreign policy decisions made by Khama was in 1978. The cabinet 
was in consensus that Botswana would continue to recognise the Island of Taiwan as the two 
countries had good relations. However, Khama insisted on the recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China instead.291  This was of course within his constitutional rights to do so, 
however, this important change in foreign policy was therefore decided by the President 
alone. This was reflective of the survivalist foreign policy that Botswana had adopted, but 
indicates that from early on in Botswana’s democracy, unilateral decision-making was in 
existence, despite the claims of consultative decision-making. More importantly, it illustrated 
that in cases where consensus building failed; the President was willing to act unilaterally.   
Sir Ketumile Masire 
Ketumile Masire was one of the founders of the BDP, served as Khama’s Vice-President for 
his entire tenure, and is Botswana’s longest serving President, having been in power for 18 
years. He is generally considered to have been a conservative leader.292 At the time of Sir 
Seretse Khama’s death in 1980, the constitution stated that should the Office of the President 
become vacant, the National Assembly would select a President to hold the position for the 
duration of that Parliament’s tenure. As Masire was not only Khama’s confidant, the Vice- 
President and the Secretary-General of the BDP, he was selected to be President.  
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The main criticisms of Masire’s tenure are; the lack of economic diversification, minimal 
government expenditure and the continued influence of expatriates in Botswana.293 
Additionally, David Magang, who was an MP during Masire’s tenure states that ‘easy 
money’ and cronyism were the hallmarks of Masire’s Presidency.294 Masire has also used his 
position as commander of the military to act against civilians. The 1995 riots which were 
sparked by the ritual murder of a young girl in Mochudi, sparked protests on several issues 
which spread across the country and particularly to the capital city. Masire responded with 
the immediate use of the military and issued the following warning: "We shall not tolerate 
lawlessness, destruction of public and private property as well as unruly behaviour…. Those 
who continue with such behaviour will regret.”295 This illustrated that the President was 
willing to deploy military force against civil unrest.296 
 
 
Masire too has used his powers of unilateral decision-making. The 1997 electoral reforms 
lowering the voting age, allowing Batswana abroad to vote, and the establishment of the IEC 
were a result of immense pressure from opposition parties, who in fact threatened to boycott 
elections if their electoral reform requests were not met. This led to Masire announcing his 
decision, without consulting the party leadership or cabinet in an interview on Radio 
Botswana that the government would concede to the demands of the opposition parties.297 
Additionally, Masire, just as Khama had ensured his ascendency to the Presidency, ensured 
that before his resignation the constitutional amendment allowing for automatic succession of 
the Vice President to the Presidency was in place.298 The automatic succession amendment 
was resisted by the cabinet, but the collective responsibility principle bound the cabinet to 
support this decision in Parliament.299  
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When the Vice-President, Lenyeletse Seretse, the late Presidents cousin, died in 1983, Masire 
appointed the Minister of Finance and Development Planning and long-time political ally; 
Peter Mmusi as the Vice-President ending the traditional ‘balance’ between the President and 
Vice-President in which either of the two came from the Central District.300 
 
 
The most controversial appointments Masire made, however, were after the 1994 elections. 
Masire re-instated two former government members, Daniel Kwelagobe and Ronald Sebego. 
The two (along with Peter Mmusi) had been forced to vacate their positions in 1992, due to 
the Presidential commission of inquiry reports which stated that Kwelagobe had used his 
friendship with Mmusi, (at the time: Vice-President and the Minister of Local Government, 
Lands and Housing) to attain land illegally. Sebego, the Assistant Minister of Local 
Government, had allocated Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) houses to friends, 
allowing them to skip a waiting list of approximately 20 000 people.301 To replace the Vice-
President, Masire then appointed Festus Mogae as his deputy, without consultation.302  
 
 
Two years later, in 1994, Masire appointed Kwelagobe as the Minister of Works, Transport 
and Communication, while Sebego was appointed Assistant Minister of Agriculture. This 
was interpreted as Masire condoning corrupt practices, and that he did not value ideals such 
as political responsibility and accountability.303 That being said however, the DCEC, the IEC 
and the Office of the Ombudsman were formed during his tenure, a move that on the surface 
seemed to encourage and support democracy and were a response to the corruption incidents 
and pressures from the opposition, reflecting the increasing importance and role that the 
opposition could have on decisions made by the presidency, despite the little independence 
which these institutions had. By the time they were fully operational, Masire had already 
resigned, thus the institutions did not have a significant role during his presidency. 
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Foreign Policy  
Masire’s foreign policy decisions were made in conjunction with his close advisors, 
Mpotokwane and Festus Mogae.304 Masire however, played a central role in Botswana’s 
foreign policy.305 In fact, during his time as Vice-President, Masire played a key role in 
establishing relationships with other African leaders.306 After resigning from the Presidency, 
Masire has thus played the role of mediator and peacekeeper throughout the continent. Masire 
notes that although Botswana was dedicated to promoting democracy, this was done in 
private and quietly with the government or President of that particular country.307 This to an 
extent highlights that the solidarity norm had an influence on the manner in which he pursued 
the long established principle of promoting democracy on the continent.  
 
 
During Masire’s tenure, he was criticised for the failure to act more assertively in relation to 
the situation in South Africa. However, given that Botswana was still heavily reliant on South 
Africa, and thus the context which existed during the tenure of Seretse Khama had not 
changed, Masire’s position in relation to South Africa remained unchanged. This approach 
was based on a position established during the tenure of his predecessor of not using 
emotions and sentiments to make decisions, but rather the interests of Batswana.308 Masire 
did however, despite pressure to sign a non-aggression accord, refuse to do so saying that he 
would not sign it ‘at any price’ and that Botswana would “not trade principles for 
expediency.”309 Thus, although Botswana was still limited by its geo-political circumstances, 
and could not radically change its approach, the diamond fuelled economic growth gave it 
sufficient funds to rely less on South African imports if need be, and thus allowed it to 
increasingly adopt an independent and hostile approach in its relations with South Africa.  
 
 
The 1997 electoral reforms, in which Masire was criticised for unilateral decision-making, 
are also seen to have been motivated by the concern in the international community over the 
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reluctance to adopt electoral reforms that would only strengthen the democracy. Given the 
importance of Botswana’s image to the continued legitimacy of BDP rule, influenced 




Festus Gontebanye Mogae started his political career in 1989 as a specially elected member 
of Parliament and was appointed the Minister of Finance and Development Planning. Before 
this, however, after completing his Economics degree from the University of Oxford, and a 
Master’s degree in Development Economics from the University of Sussex, he became a 
career technocrat and had only worked in departments where Sir Ketumile Masire had been 
the political head.311   
 
In 1982 Mogae became Masire’s Permanent Secretary, an appointment which came as a 
shock to pundits as he was not considered to be a contender. Following the resignation of 
Peter Mmusi, Mogae became the Vice-President of Botswana in 1992. In 1994, Mogae 
returned to Parliament as the popularly elected leader of the Palapye constituency, was once 
again appointed Vice-President and, as a result of the 1997 automatic succession amendment, 
became Botswana’s third President upon Masire’s retirement in April 1998.312 Mogae 
therefore, had very little political experience, having only contested elections once, and being 
accountable to a constituency for only one term.313 
  
Mogae stated in his inaugural address that he was one of “the new breed of African 
leaders.”314 Mogae’s tenure is seen to have mainly been characterised by the aggressive 
response to Botswana’s HIV/AIDS epidemic, and he has received several accolades in 
recognition of this. At the same time however, the intolerance in the Ian Khama presidency is 
said to have been institutionalised during Mogae’s tenure.315  An instance illustrative of this 
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intolerance is when BDP backbenchers questioned the privatisation of the national airline 
(Air Botswana), Mogae criticised these MPs, and referred to them as ‘un-castrated male goats 
which were making unnecessary noise.’316 Additionally, in 2001, as a result of the Botswana 
Guardian and Midweeks Suns criticism of the President and Vice-President, a government 




Mogae broke away from the norm established by the two former Presidents by paying little 
attention to the regional and ethnic balancing in choosing his cabinet; the majority of which 
was made up of Bangwato.318 One of the most important appointment decisions made by 
Mogae, however, was that of Vice-President Ian Khama, and is indeed reflective of Mogae’s 
regard for democracy.  
 
 
In 1997, the Schelemmer Report (commissioned to help explain the BDPs poorest 
performance yet in the 1994 national elections) identified factionalism as one the main 
factors and it recommended that someone with ‘sufficient dynamism’, be used to bring the 
party together. In response to this report, Mogae then selected Ian Khama as Vice-President. 
This decision was criticised as it was made to bring stability to the party, with little regard on 
the effects it would have on the nation, given the lack of experience Khama had in politics.319 
At the start of his second term as the President (2004), upon announcing his decision to 
appoint Ian Khama as Vice-President, Mogae threatened to dissolve the democratically 
elected Parliament if they did not support his decision.320 Although the constitution allows the 
President to do so, the threat to invoke the use of an undemocratic clause for his and his 
deputy’s own benefit, reflects what constitutionalists refer to as tyranny: a leader’s decision 
that benefit himself at the expense of the people. Furthermore, Mogae allowed the Vice-
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President to fly BDF planes despite the recommendation from the Ombudsman not to do so. 
Illustrating the weakness of the Ombudsman in relation to the Presidency, but more so, 
Mogae’s regard for the institution, as one which did not limit his power, nor one which could 
influence his decisions. 
 
Foreign Policy  
As a trained economist, Mogae’s external relations have centred on the traditional focus of 
attracting investors and ensuring that the demand for Botswana’s diamonds, dependent 
largely on the image of the country as a beacon of democracy, did not falter.  As in most 
developing countries, there is very little distinction between foreign and domestic policy 
concerns. At a Diamond Trading Company gala dinner, Mogae noted that, “for our people, 
every diamond purchase represents food on the table; better living conditions; better 
healthcare; portable and safe drinking water; more roads to connect our remote communities; 
and much more.”321  
 
Mogae’s use of the Immigration Act to declare Kenneth Good a prohibited immigrant 
therefore falls under this foreign policy realm. Mogae’s use of this clause signifies not only 
the importance of diamonds for Botswana, but also the lack of tolerance during his 
presidency. Additionally, the manner in which the matter was dealt with was in itself an 
indication of the type of democracy in Botswana, one which ultimately, is not committed to 
ensuring that democratic principles such as freedom of speech are upheld, but rather a 
commitment to the image of being a democracy. Mogae’s foreign policy can therefore be 
characterised as that of ‘diamond diplomacy’322 focused on ensuring that a consumer boycott 
on ‘blood diamonds’, or the hostility shown to ‘undemocratic nations’ did not affect demand 
for Botswana’s diamonds.  
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Good notes that one of Mogae’s most important decisions was his unilateral decision to 
commit Botswana’s military to quelling the political unrest in Lesotho, in 1998.323 Although 
the goal was to restore democracy and human rights, the decision is not one that should have 
been made without consultation of the Cabinet and parliament.  
 
 
Another key occurrence during Mogae’s tenure was his response to the political crisis in 
Zimbabwe. During Mogae’s tenure, South Africa made its position on Zimbabwe very clear. 
In 2003, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and now African Union Commission Secretary; 
Nkhosana Dlamini Zuma stated that “we [South Africa] will never criticise Zimbabwe.”324 
Mogae, followed suit and took an ‘ambivalent stance’.325 This is largely also as a result of 
Botswana’s traditional preference for proceeding under the auspices of SADC. Thus, 
SADC’s support for Mugabe meant that Botswana would do the same,326 particularly so as 





Lieutenant General Seretse Khama Ian Khama, the current President of Botswana is the 
oldest son of Botswana’s first President Sir Seretse Khama (and Lady Ruth Khama), and is 
Chief of the Bangwato; a position he did not renounce despite the constitutional provision 
introduced by his father in 1972 that requires chiefs to have resigned for a minimum of five 
years before entering into politics. Khama’s only formal education was military training at 
Sandhurst Military Academy.328 He began his political career in 1998 after he resigned from 
the BDF. He was appointed Minister for Presidential affairs and Administration (now State 
Presidency), and later on that year stood for by-elections in the Serowe-North constituency; 
the constituency where he is the Chief. Khama was then nominated to be Vice-President. In 
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the 1999 general election, he once again won the Parliamentary seat for the Serowe-North 
constituency and was once more ‘endorsed’ by Parliament as Vice-President. In the following 
general elections, Ian Khama stood unopposed and won the Serowe North-West constituency 
and was once again appointed to be Vice-President; with Mogae’s threat to dissolve 
Parliament having facilitated Parliament’s support for his appointment. Upon, President 
Mogae’s resignation in 2008, in accordance with the ten-year term limit established towards 
the end of Masire’s tenure, and the automatic succession provision, Ian Khama became 
Botswana’s fourth President.  
 
Khama’s leadership style has been described as ‘authoritarian’. Initially Mompati Merafhe, 
who was Khama’s commander in the BDF, led the group in opposition to Khama. This group 
attempted to change the constitution to bar automatic succession of the Vice-President upon 
the retirement or death of the President. Ponatshego Kedikilwe was also against Khama’s 
presidency, stating that during Khama’s tenure, democracy would give way to autocracy.329 
Merafhe and Kedikilwe both later served as Vice-President under Ian Khama’s first tenure, 
highlighting that in Botswana political differences are not based on ideological differences or 
principles, but on opportunism, and thus are easily changed; reflecting that in Botswana’s 
politics there are indeed no permanent enemies or friends, only permanent interests.  
 
At the beginning of his presidency, Khama outlined his roadmap for the nation; which has 
come to be referred to as the “Five D’s”: Democracy, Development, Dignity, Delivery and 
Discipline.  ‘Discipline’, was seen to highlight the type of rule of Khama desired, that of 
“command, control, programme, force and order.”330 Given the manner in which Khama 
came to the Presidency, and his tenure as Vice-President, widespread criticism was to be 
expected. However, it is the sustained nature of this criticism from the media, academics and 
the public which has alerted democracy watchers to assess Khama’s presidency.  Khama’s 
presidency has been characterised by the lack of freedom of speech, both within the party and 
externally. For instance: a BDP backbencher was made to publicly withdraw his comments 
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against the Khama-inspired liquor regulations.331 Criticism has even come from Khama’s 
allies.  A former Presidential advisor and long-time BDP member Sidney Pilane wrote an 
article on and to Ian Khama in which he says:  
“I write with great reluctance, but the President needs to know that it is not only the 
Press and Opposition Parties who are concerned about his brand of democracy; many of 
us of the BDP and his staunch supporters (and we truly are, but refuse to be blind) are 
watching with growing consternation his style which is making our country look less and 
less like a democracy. He needs to re-think his approach; we need to see his style 
becoming less and less military, autocratic one-man-rule, and more and more like 
teamwork. The constitution enjoins him to have a Cabinet of Ministers who 
meaningfully participate in and aid his governance of the country, and not people he 
employs as errand boys and girls.”332  
 
Another defining feature of Khama’s presidency thus far was his response to the 2011 public 
sector strike that lasted for almost two months.333 The Botswana Federation of Public Service 
unions (BOFEPUSU) demanded a 16 per cent salary increase; which the government could 
not meet. The deadlock led to the unions going on strike to force the government to meet 
their demands. Throughout this strike, the President consistently turned down requests for a 
meeting to discuss this issue.334 Once again, as in other Presidents tenures, illustrating that 
Botswana’s democracy is not as consultative as those who praise Botswana claim. 
Furthermore, after this strike, the government classified the employees who had been on 
strike under ‘essential services’, which therefore meant that they would in future be unable to 
strike.335  
 
Appointment Powers  
Khama’s decision to unilaterally nominate additional members of the faction he sympathised 
with to the central and sub-committees of the party, led to a break in the BDP. Gomolemo 
Motswaledi questioned Khama’s powers to have unilaterally nominated these additional 
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members, as this was against tradition in the party as well as his decision to side with a 
particular faction; which no other President had overtly done. Khama responded by 
suspending Motswaledi for 2 months, and recalled him as the party’s candidate for Gaborone 
central.336 Although Motswaledi challenged the suspension and recall, he lost the case as Ian 
Khama being President, as stipulated by the constitution has immunity from prosecution, 
even for non-state related issues.337 This led to the resignation of Motswaledi and other 
members in the Central Committee who then formed the Botswana Movement for 
Democracy (BMD).338 Factionalism in the BDP had been apparent since the early nineties, 
and scholars have noted that only during the tenure of Ian Khama did this factionalism lead to 
a break within the party. This split was thus provoked by Khama’s authoritarian style of 
ruling and his lack of tolerance for dissent.339  
 
Khama has been accused of militarising Botswana. This is not only because a range of public 
offices such as the Director of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS) and 
Commissioner of Prisons were formerly in the military, but because Khama’s cabinet is 
riddled with the same problem.340 Additionally, like his predecessor, he has not attempted to 
maintain an ethnic and regional balance in his cabinet, and has selected mainly MPs from the 
North.341 In Khama’s first cabinet, he appointed the following positions to former military 
members: the Vice-President was Lieutenant-General Mompati Merafhe, Minister of 
Defence, Justice and Security was Brigadier Ramadeluka Seretse (Khama’s cousin) and the 
Minister of Environment Wildlife and Tourism was Captain Kitso Mokaila.  
 
After the resignation of Lt. General Mompati Merafhe, Khama reshuffled the cabinet and 
appointed his younger brother Tshekedi Khama as Minister of Wildlife, Environment and 
Tourism, who, according to the opposition, was not necessarily a strong/influential performer 
and thus the appointment was not based on merit or his performance as an MP,342 thus 
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leading to the conclusion that the appointment was based on his relationship to the President, 
as well as Khama’s involvement in the Tourism industry. Ian Khama is a 5% shareholder in 
Linyati Investments, a subsidiary of Wilderness Holdings.343 Thus, while the practice of 
making appointments according to loyalties rather than merit has existed since Seretse 
Khama’s presidency, it is the extent to which Ian Khama has used this power, filling too 
many posts using this power, causing criticism from within the party. In response to the 
criticism made about how Khama uses his appointment powers, Jeff Ramsey, the Presidents 
Press Secretary, responded by stating that Nelson Mandela had appointed his former wife 
Winnie Mandela as the Deputy Arts Minister.344 
 
On top of the weakness noted on the DCEC, Khama has also appointed his close ally to be 
the director of the DCEC (Khama’s cousin-in-law), and as WikiLeaks revealed in 2011, 
Khama interfered with a DCEC investigation involving his brothers, Tshekedi and 
Anthony.345 Additionally, Fombad notes that under the Presidency of Ian Khama, judicial 
independence is at risk as not only is Khama a critic of the judiciary, he now has taken over 
judicial appointments, and in certain instances has made appointments without the 
involvement of the JSC.346 Furthermore, Khama’s disregard for the Ombudsman’s 
recommendations that he no longer fly BDF planes while he was Vice-President, gives little 
hope that during his Presidency, his lack of respect for the processes and recommendations of 
the Ombudsman would change. 
  
Foreign Policy  
Ian Khama’s foreign policy has been markedly different from his predecessors, and is thus 
considered to be controversial, or as leader of the opposition; Dumelang Saleshando states, 
“reckless”; in response to Khama’s criticism of Syria’s President Assad. Saleshando notes 
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that this action was picking an unnecessary fight and placing Batswana at jeopardy.347 
Botswana also famously stood against the African Union resolution in support of Kenya’s 
Uhuru Kenyatta that called into question the conduct of the International Criminal Court for 
supposedly unfairly targeting African leaders. This decision boosted Botswana’s reputation in 
the human rights and international justice realm.348  
 
One of Khama’s most controversial foreign policy positions thus far, has been his response to 
Zimbabwe’s political crisis. The inclination for African Presidents to support and protect 
each other which has existed since independence, has not affected Ian Khama, who, during 
his presidency has been very vocal against Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. As has been the 
norm in Botswana, decisions made at the SADC level are abided by as seen during Mogae 
and Masire’s tenure. During Ian Khama’s presidency, Botswana was not deterred by SADC’s 
decision to ‘go soft’ on Mugabe and pursued a unilateral approach of boycotts, and 
threatened military intervention.349 Khama, contrary to the norm established since 
independence of privately dealing with such matters with the government in question, 
publically declared its opposition against ZANU-PF and its leader. At the same time 
however, there have been inconsistencies in this practice which have caused criticism, such 
as the continued silence on the abuse of power by Swaziland’s King Mswati.350 
 
Khama’s approach to Zimbabwe has been public, and contrary to the decisions or positions 
taken at the AU and SADC level. In fact, Khama has little regard for these regional bodies, 
illustrated by his lack of attendance at heads of state meetings.351 According to Fombad, 
Botswana’s most controversial action has been the refusal to join the New Partnership for 
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African Development/African Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD/APRM). The reason for 
refusing to join was that Botswana had nothing to learn from this institution.352 The continued 
praise for Botswana is therefore seen to have given rise to “good governance complacency 
and isolationism.”353  
 
* 
The analysis of each President’s tenure has revealed that in different ways, each President has 
contributed to the entrenchment of non-democratic practices. Unilateral decision-making, 
rooted in Botswana’s traditional chieftaincy system and non-merit based appointments have 
been common practice since the presidency of Seretse Khama. Ian Khama, has however, 
made use of these powers in a substantially different manner than his predecessors, which has 
even caused internal conflict within the ruling party.  
 
The foreign policy dimension has served as an indicator for the character of the presidents as 
it illustrates the types of decisions they have made. Each President has taken actions within 
the foreign policy realm which may be considered to be controversial or reckless; for instance 
Seretse Khama’s bold stance on race despite being apartheid South Africa’s immediate 
neighbour with no military to prevent against the possible retaliation to this stance. The 
extensive powers of the President in foreign policy have further entrenched the culture of 
Presidents being able to decide alone. At the same time however, it is evident that external 
dynamics often do affect presidential decisions, even in their use of unilateral decision 
making; particularly in attempts to sustain the positive image of Botswana’s democracy. 
Another key aspect in the foreign policy realm is that to a certain extent all previous 
presidents were influenced by the solidarity norm, and therefore had a less independent 
foreign policy position. Ian Khama, has a much more independent foreign policy, his 
increased use of unilateral decision-making power in comparison to his predecessors is 
evident in its extension to the foreign policy realm where regional bodies have had little 
influence on Botswana’s foreign policy. Thus, Khama’s tenure marks a change in the style of 
leadership.  
                                                 








The main goal of this paper has been to assess the character of Botswana’s presidency.  This 
has been done through an analysis of the environmental, governmental and idiosyncratic 
levels of analysis. While not disputing the conclusions in the negative literature that has 
emerged on Botswana’s democracy, I argued that to make such conclusions, it was necessary 
to take a historical approach in analysing the Office of the President, which required an 
assessment of both the institution and each President’s tenure. In order for the character of the 
presidency to be fully understood, the wider scope of presidential hegemony; how and why 
so much power came to rest in the hands of the President as well as the endurance of 
presidential hegemony were explored. Furthermore, the establishment of institutions which 
are meant to deepen Botswana’s democracy, and in different ways, place limitation on the 
power of the President, were explored to highlight the extent of presidential power. In taking 
this multi-level approach to assessing Botswana’s presidency, the hope is that it has made 
Presidential dominance, its endurance, its scope of influence in Botswana’s democracy and 
the role of each President in sculpting the institution of the Presidency understandable.   
 
While the paper was to a certain extent therefore a response to literature on Ian Khama’s 
presidency, the aim of this paper, was not simply to verify or refute claims of growing 
authoritarianism in the current Presidency, but more to emphasise that an understanding of 
the current presidency must be based in the understanding of the institution since 
independence, as well as the tenures of the different Presidents enabling an understanding of 
the different dynamics and influences that have shaped Botswana’s Presidency, and to more 
accurately determine in what way the character of the Presidency has changed. 
 
This paper has therefore highlighted the following: 
The founding fathers; Masire and Seretse Khama, were accumulatively; in power for the first 
32 years of Botswana’s now 47-year-old democracy. While their leadership style may have 




occurred from Seretse to Masire’s Presidency. Not only did Masire support the foundations 
laid by Seretse Khama, he played a key role in the formation of those principles and thus his 
time as President was characterised by the continuation and further entrenchment of practices 
established during Seretse’s presidency. In fact, in 1987, Picard noted that “continuity, rather 
than change, characterised the patterns of political activity in Botswana after 1966.”354 As 
seen in Table 4, the most significant constitutional changes to occur which directly affected 
the nature of Presidential power, however, occurred during these 32 years. They, however, 
have not expanded presidential power.   
 
Table 4: Constitutional Amendments Affecting Presidential Power 
Year  Amendments 
1972 President is an ex-officio member of the national assembly. 
1997 Presidential Tenure limited to 10 years. 
1997 Automatic succession of Vice-President upon the  Presidents vacation of office 
1997 Vice-President must be selected from elected MPs 
 
Beyond these constitutional amendments, the main change during Masire’s tenure was the 
institutional environment within which the President would function within. The DCEC, IEC 
and Office of the Ombudsman were established, marking the deepening of Botswana’s 
democracy and a change in the role of the Presidency. This, however, was in theory only, for 
while the intended purpose of the institutions reflects the deepening of democracy, the 
appointment powers of the President amongst other provisions, compromised the 
independence of these institutions. 
 
Although Mogae began his Presidency by introducing himself as a new breed of African 
leadership, there was much continuity in his presidency. In 2006, Good stated that, “so 
elevated, all three Presidents to date have been ready to subordinate the law and constitution 
to the political exigencies of the time on more than one occasion.”355 Mogae, as the first 
President to rule after the establishment of the Ombudsman set a dangerous precedent by 
refusing to abide by the Ombudsman’s recommendation to stop his Vice-President from 
flying BDF planes, sending a message that indeed the newly formed democracy protection 
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institutions essentially had little effect on the manner in which the presidency operated and 
therefore the character of the presidency in general. 
 
Additionally, at the end of Mogae’s tenure, there were minimal changes in Botswana’s 
foreign policy and international relations.  Foreign policy can generally be characterised as 
cautious during the tenure of the first three Presidents. Botswana’s geographical limitations 
played a key role in this. Furthermore, despite the economic progress made, the need for 
continued international assistance and investment, and a market for Botswana’s diamonds has 
meant that the foreign policy objectives have remained the same, and the approach of the first 
three Presidents relatively the same as well.  
 
Thus, as illustrated in chapter 4, the presidency of Ian Khama, while having certain 
similarities with the previous three Presidents, is markedly different. Good states that “respect 
for the rule of law and for established institutions and processes declined” after Ian Khama 
became vice-President in 1998, and this worsened when he became President in 2008.356 The 
autocratic nature of Ian Khama’s leadership cannot be denied. Having served as Chief, as 
well as in the military, Khama’s decision-making style is significantly different from all three 
Presidents. His lack of tolerance for dissent, and the frequency with which he has made 
unilateral decisions at the party and governmental level, illustrate his disregard to at least 
appear to be interested in consensus building as Botswana’s Presidents have traditionally 
done.  
 
Corrupt practices, appointments based on loyalties rather than merit, presidential control over 
elections, the power to prohibit investigation on certain cases or people have, however, been 
in place since independence in 1966. It is therefore the continuation of these practices, despite 
the establishment of institutions that were created to limit this behaviour which is 
problematic, and therefore raising criticism on the last two and more particularly, the current 
                                                 




President. Despite complaints on the lack of independence of the democracy protection 
institutions, Khama has been reluctant to reform the IEC, DCEC and the Ombudsman.357  
 
Therefore, while the changes in the character of the Presidency are seen to have begun, but I 
argue were merely evident from Mogae’s tenure, his tenure was the first in which institutions 
that were meant to play a check and balance role were introduced yet clearly had little impact 
in changing the status quo. Before their establishment, the extent and scope of the powers of 
the presidency were known, however, the emergence of these institutions was meant to limit 
presidential power in those specific areas. It is the inability of those institutions to do so that 
has exposed that their establishment was to illustrate a commitment to democracy rather than 
an actual commitment, as evidenced by the inability of these institutions to limit presidential 
power, let alone to act independently. Thus, while constitutionally there have been few 
changes to the character of the presidency; the institutional environment within which Mogae 
and Ian Khama have functioned within has highlighted the extensive powers of the 
presidency that make these institutions ineffective, yet are practices and behaviour which 
have existed since independence.  
 
While at the foreign policy level, Ian Khama has been characterised as having been reckless 
and controversial, the main principles and foundations of Botswana’s foreign policy have 
remained the same. The focus on democracy promotion and on portraying Botswana as a 
liberal, democratic and stable country is the same. What has changed is the manner in which 
these objectives have been pursued. While the first three Presidents used private mechanisms 
to influence democratic changes, and were influenced by a focus on unity with other African 
states, Khama’s approach has been different. Khama has used public means, and has not been 
influenced or bound by decisions made at the regional and continental level, making 
Botswana’s foreign policy independent and free from any aspect of the solidarity norm 
common throughout the continent, in fact, many have celebrated this as a much needed 
approach to anti-democratic behaviour on the continent.  
 
                                                 




Thus, the character of the presidency has not changed in terms of its scope or extent of 
power; there have been very few constitutional changes which directly affect presidential 
power. What has changed is the institutional environment in which the presidency functions 
within, and therefore this has affected evaluations or assessments of the presidency, given the 
lack of an accompanying change in the behaviour or practices of the Presidency. The picture 
that emerges about Botswana’s democracy is that it has invested in the appearance of, rather 
than the actual pursuit of democracy since independence, as evidenced by some of the issues 
and topics discussed under each President.  
 
This project has therefore highlighted that Botswana’s constitution is the main threat to 
Botswana’s democracy, rather than the current President. The constitution vests too much 
power in the presidency and makes it difficult for the decisions the President makes to be 
challenged. Thus, although Botswana is democratic in the sense that it holds regular 
elections, and has basic political freedoms, the mechanisms to ensure that it functions in a 
democratic manner, are flawed. The constitution and several of Botswana’s legislation entrust 
Botswana’s democracy to the benevolence of the President. This evaluation highlights two 
key points to avoid the ‘slow death of democracy’ in Botswana. First, the immense powers 
vested in the presidency necessitates that the President be popularly elected, to ensure 
accountably to the electorate. Alternatively, the constitution must be amended to limit 
Presidential power, as well as the legislation that established and governs these democracy 
protection institutions (particularly the appointments of key individuals); to allow these 
institutions to play the check and balance role they were intended to play.  
 
The above is unlikely to occur given that the only people who currently can make these 
changes (BDP government) benefit from the current system. Thus, the solution lies in 
literature such as this research project, to make the problem of centralized power 
understandable, to illustrate the threats to Botswana’s democracy, and therefore inform 
Batswana so as to drive them to play a greater role in the country’s politics, influencing 
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